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Article 3

Revisiting the History of
Scientific Expert Testimony
Tal Golan†
INTRODUCTION
This Article provides a broad historical narrative of
scientific expert testimony in the adversarial courtroom, from
the late eighteenth century to the present. No such narrative
exists in the current literature and it would good to have one,
considering the growing attention to the topic in the last two
decades. This Article identifies four large-scale developments
that were involved in the shaping of modern scientific expert
testimony as we have come to know it today: the place of the
expert in the courtroom; the nature of the expertise deployed;
the amount and importance of expert testimony; and the
treatment of expert testimony in the courtroom.
The first development was part of the fundamental
transformation of the English legal system that took place
during the later part of the eighteenth century and came to be
known as the Adversarial Revolution. This development
changed the position of the expert in the courtroom, shifting it
from a neutral court-appointed position to that of a partisan
witness, chosen and paid by the parties. The second
development also started during the second part of the
eighteenth century. It involved changes in the scientific
community that began to narrow its focus to the inanimate
world and provided first indications of practical utility. Legal
historians have paid little attention to this important
development, which redefined the legal range of recognized
expertise and introduced into the courtroom a new figure—the
proto-scientist, who functioned like a skilled professional but
cogitated like a natural philosopher. The third development
was associated with the Industrial Revolution and with the
further development of science. Originating in late eighteenth-
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century England and extending in America well into the late
nineteenth century, the Industrial Revolution brought to the
courts a rising tide of cases involving technological and
scientific argumentation. This development established the
newly defined scientific expert witness as a pivotal but also
highly problematic figure in the modern courtroom. The fourth
development took place during the twentieth century and was
driven by the professionalization of science and by society’s
growing dependence on science. This growing dependence
forced the courts to take an active role in managing the
deployment of science in the courts, and the professionalization
and standardization of twentieth century science offered the
courts new means to do so. Consequently, the twentiethcentury trial judge turned into an active gatekeeper, charged
with the responsibility of screening unreliable scientific
evidence away from the jury.
This Article’s first five parts are structured around
these developments. Part I discusses the emerging role of the
partisan expert witness during the Adversarial Revolution. The
main argument in this Part is that the newly defined expert
witness was not conceived as a premeditated judicial solution
to the problems of deploying expertise in the new adversarial
courtroom. Instead, the partisan expert witness emerged as a
necessary exception, the only source of information the new
system could not rationalize under its evolving doctrines. And,
as such, it would stay—an incompatible yet indispensable
figure in the modern adversarial courtroom.
Part II discusses the changing nature of expert
testimony during the late eighteenth century. To that end, it
focuses on the 1782 case Folkes v. Chadd, a legal episode that
became iconic in the legal literature as the origin story for
modern expert testimony. A close look demonstrates that
Folkes v. Chadd showed little judicial concern with the
problems awaiting partisan expertise in the modern
adversarial courtroom. Instead, the case revolved around a
different important problem—the legal status of a nascent
species of experts, the proto-scientists, or Newtonian
philosophers as they were then styled, who propounded in
court theories whose station on the legal continuum between
fact and speculation were yet to be settled.
Parts III and IV discuss the nineteenth-century
developments of scientific expert testimony in England and
America, respectively. They demonstrate that while the volume
of scientific expert testimony constantly increased during the
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nineteenth century, the respect paid to it by the courts and the
public constantly diminished. The main argument here is that
by the late nineteenth century the putative problem of
scientific expert testimony had already acquired most of the
features that today are blithely assumed to be new. These two
Parts further suggest that, although first raising its head in
English courts, it was in America that the problem of expert
testimony reached its fullest expression.
Part V discusses the twentieth-century attempts to
control the problem of scientific expert testimony. Much of the
current scholarship portrays the controversies surrounding
scientific expert testimony as a late twentieth-century
development, the result of the difficulties of the courts and the
lay jury in handling the growing volume and complexity of
modern science. The discussion in Part VI paints a more
nuanced picture. Far from being a late twentieth-century
pathology, the putative problem of scientific expert testimony
has been chronic for over two centuries. Moreover, during the
twentieth century, the courts were able to take advantage of
the professionalization of science and the standardization of
the market of expertise and actually improved their ability to
control the performance of science in the courtroom.
I.

THE EMERGING ROLE OF THE PARTISAN EXPERT
WITNESS

Common law has long acknowledged the importance of
scientific advice in cases where the disputed facts were such
that the courts lacked sufficient knowledge to draw from them
an informed decision. In 1554, an English judge declared:
[I]f matters arise in our law which concern other sciences or
faculties, we commonly apply for the aid of that science or faculty
which it concerns. Which is an honourable and commendable thing
in our law. For thereby it appears that we do not despise all other
sciences but our own, but we approve of them and encourage them as
things worthy of commendation.1

Over the centuries the legal system had developed two
procedural options to deploy such sciences in the courtroom by
experts who, from their special training and experience, could

1
Buckley v. Rice Thomas, 1 Plowden 118, 124, 75 Eng. Rep. 182, 192 (1554)
(Saunders, J.).
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instruct the court and the jury in regard to the disputed facts.2
The first option was to call them as jurors.3 The second was for
the court to nominate them as consultants whose advice the
court or the jury could adopt as they pleased.4
There was also a third option, which was for the parties
to call experts as witnesses testifying on their behalf. 5
However, unlike court experts and expert juries, there was no
special procedure that would define such witnesses as experts.
Thus, physicians and surgeons testified in criminal, insurance,
and will cases; surveyors testified in property cases; linguists
testified concerning the meaning of Latin phrases used in
contracts; merchants concerning the particular customs and
norms of trade; tradesmen concerning the quality of particular
goods; ship builders concerning the state and construction of
vessels; other artisans concerning their respective subjects of
mechanical skill, and so on and so forth. 6 However, these
testifying experts were not clearly differentiated from all other
lay witnesses, who often were also allowed to testify to their
opinions, especially if it was based on their direct knowledge of
the facts of the case. Thus, in the absence of a procedure that
would define witnesses as experts or a theory that would
restrict lay witnesses from testifying to their opinions, the
testifying experts were regarded and treated merely as
witnesses.7
The theories and practices that differentiated the
testifying experts from all other lay witnesses evolved only late
in the eighteenth century, as part of a larger transformation of
the English legal system that came to be known as the
Adversarial Revolution. This so-called revolution was primarily
associated with the expanding presence of lawyers in criminal
proceedings.8 Until the 1700s, lawyers were generally kept out

2
J.H. Beuscher, The Use of Experts by the Courts, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1105,
1108-10 (1941); Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding
Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40-43 (1902); see also 4 THOMAS ROGER
FORBES, SURGEONS AT THE BAILEY 26-33 (1985).
3
James C. Oldham, The Origins of the Special Jury, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 137,
173-75 (1983).
4
Beuscher, supra note 2, at 1109-10.
5
Hand, supra note 2, at 43-50.
6
Id.
7
4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE § 1917, at 101-03 (2d ed. 1923).
8
John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L.
REV. 263, 307-14 (1978).
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of criminal trials.9 The judges dominated the proceedings, and
evidence was mostly adduced by direct in-court altercation
between the accuser, the accused, and the witnesses, and by
the judge, who examined the parties and the witnesses
himself.10 In this environment, which kept criminal proceedings
quick and simple, testimonial constraints had little, if any,
meaning.11 Thus, although the common law requirement that
regular testimony be limited to personal knowledge based on
experience was old, lay witnesses were nevertheless allowed to
testify to their opinion or present hearsay evidence. And if an
objection was raised, the courts were content with allowing it to
go to the weight of the evidence rather than to its
admissibility.12
By the 1730s, defense counsel began to participate in
regular criminal proceedings. Not yet allowed to directly
address the jury, they were permitted to gather and adduce
evidence and examine and cross-examine witnesses. The
reasons for this “most remarkable change” to ever take place in
English criminal law (as the noted Victorian judge and legal
historian Sir James Fitzjames Stephen called it13) are not fully
clear. It has been suggested that the appearance of the defense
lawyer was, at least partially, a response to the expanding
prosecutorial capacities of the Crown.14 Whatever the reasons
were, by the second part of the eighteenth century, according to
Stephen, “A practice sprung up . . . by which counsel were
allowed to do everything for prisoners accused of felony except
addressing the jury.”15 The active participation of the lawyers
slowly reshaped the processes of criminal litigation. Outside
the courtroom the lawyers gave new significance to pretrial
activities such as preparing records and seeking out witnesses.
9
J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND 352-56 (1986); THOMAS
ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH
CRIMINAL JURY 1200-1800, 135-36 (1988); Langbein, supra note 8, at 310.
10
See J.S. COCKBURN, HISTORY OF ENGLISH ASSIZES 1558-1714, at 120-21
(1972).
11
Cockburn reports that one judge heard as many as fifty Crown cases a day.
Id. at 109.
12
Charles T. McCormick, Some Observations upon the Opinion Rule and
Expert Testimony, 23 TEX. L. REV. 109, 109-12 (1945); 9 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 211-14 (1926).
13
1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 424 (London, MacMillan 1883).
14
Stephan Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary
Procedures in Eighteenth Century England, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 497, 572-80 (1990).
15
STEPHEN, supra note 13, at 424.
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Inside the courtroom they increasingly took over the
examination of witnesses, developed the techniques of crossexamination to perfection, and even established the right to
argue points of law.16
Looking back, William Best, a leading mid-nineteenthcentury authority on legal evidence, wrote that “the necessary
consequence of [allowing defense counsel in criminal cases] was
that objections to the admissibility of evidence were much more
frequently taken, the attention of the judges was more directed
to the subject of evidence, their judgments were better
considered, and their decisions better remembered.”17 Indeed,
still prohibited from speaking directly to the jury, the lawyers
mostly fought their battles over the content and the
presentation of the evidence before the jury in terms of
evidentiary objections.18 By the end of the eighteenth century
these evidentiary battles had produced two powerful legal
doctrines: the hearsay doctrine, which attempted to limit
testimony to information based solely on personal observation,
and the opinion doctrine, which sought to control the form in
which witnesses communicated their perceptions to the jury,
requiring them not to use inferences where the subject matter
is susceptible to factual statements.19
These two powerful evidentiary doctrines rendered the
expert witness into a distinct legal entity. However, they did so
indirectly, by curtailing the privileges of all other testimonial
sources until only the testifying expert was left as the last but
necessary exception to the rules—a witness who did not have to
observe the facts of the case personally but nevertheless was
allowed to pronounce an opinion on them in court. The expert
16
Landsman, supra note 14, at 539-42, 548-52; John H. Langbein, Shaping
the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 123-34 (1983); Langbein, supra note 8, at 312.
17
W.M. BEST, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE AS
TO PROOFS IN COURTS OF COMMON LAW § 109, at 99 (Phila., T. & J.W. Johnson 1849).
18
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 101-04, 300-01
(3d ed. 2001); see generally T.P. Gallanis, The Rise of Modern Evidence Law, 84 IOWA L.
REV. 499 (1999); Stephan Landsman, From Gilbert to Bentham: The
Reconceptualization of Evidence Theory, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1149 (1990); James
Oldham, Truth-Telling in the Eighteenth-Century English Courtroom, 12 LAW & HIST.
REV. 95 (1994). The prohibition on the defense counsel to address the jury in
summation was abolished by legislation only in 1836. See John M. Beattie, Scales of
Justice: Defense Counsel and the English Criminal Trial in the Eighteenth and
Nineteenth Centuries, 9 LAW & HIST. REV. 221, 250-58 (1991).
19
See Landsman, supra note 14, at 572; Gallanis, supra note 17, at 530-37;
see also Hand, supra note 2, at 44-45; John H. Wigmore, The History of the Hearsay
Rule, 17 HARV. L. REV. 437, 448 (1904).
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witness was not conceived therefore as a deliberate judicial
solution to the problems of deploying expertise in the new
adversarial courtroom. Instead, the expert remained as the
only source of information the new system could not rationalize
under its evolving doctrines—a freak, if you will, in the new
adversarial courtroom.
The new adversarial system not only redefined the role
of the expert as a partisan witness but also had a dramatic
effect on the deployment of expert testimony in the courtroom.
Traditionally, experts, whether as part of the jury or as court
advisors, were summoned and controlled by the court, which
conferred on these experts a large degree of impartiality. But
during the late eighteenth century, as the court gradually
assumed a neutral position, as the litigants assumed
responsibility for developing their own proof in court and
summoned their own experts to represent them before the jury,
and as adversarial ideology was given free reign, a demanding
problem seemed to emerge: how to ensure that in this
adversarial environment the lay jury would still have access to
reliable expert guidance when the jury needed it. Surprisingly,
though, an analysis of major late eighteenth and early
nineteenth-century rulings finds little judicial awareness of
this problem. While the judges were certainly busy with the
delicate act of balancing the demands of the increasingly
defined rules of evidence with the growing supply of expert
testimony, they seemed far less concerned that the practice
itself of calling experts as partisan witnesses was expanding.
The absence of judicial anxiety about expert testimony
is all the more remarkable if we take into account that there
was ample judicial dismay about lay witnesses for hire. The
late eighteenth century was a period in which the slightest
interest in the result of the trial rendered the witness
unreliable.20 Persons were not allowed to testify in cases in
which they had financial interest.21 Husbands and wives were
forbidden from testifying for or against each other.22 Even the
parties to the lawsuit themselves, by the same reasoning, were
not allowed to testify.23 Why then the expert witness for hire?

20

1 SIR GEOFFREY GILBERT ET AL., THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 105-31 (London,
W. Clarke & Sons et al., 6th ed. 1801).
21
Id. at 106-16.
22
Id. at 119-21.
23
Id. at 116-19.
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We will return to this question toward the end of the next
section.
II.

THE CHANGING NATURE OF EXPERTISE

The practice of deploying expertise in the new
adversarial courtroom was not the only thing that was
changing during the late eighteenth century. A second change,
equally important, was in the nature of the expertise deployed
in the courtroom. For centuries, experts summoned to give
their opinions in the courtroom were men of large and tested
experience, who, from their special training and experience,
could instruct the court and the jury in regard to the disputed
facts. The specialized knowledge these experts brought to the
courts was expected to be based on personal and empirical
observations, readily traceable to the specific training and
experience of the particular expert pronouncing it. Distilled
through ages of legal experience and immortalized in the early
seventeenth-century writings of Lord Chancellor Francis
Bacon, this legal epistemology disdained abstract explanations
and stressed the necessity of direct observational data in
processes of proof.24
By the late eighteenth century, however, a new culture
of expertise began its rise to dominance, which defied this
epistemology. This was the culture of science, confident in its
ability to discern the hidden laws of nature, however subtle
their workings were. At the start of the eighteenth century,
this was still a bookish culture that studied nature in general,
but by the end of the century it had narrowed its focus to the
inanimate world, supplemented books with experiments,
borrowed some mathematics, and gave indications of practical
utility. Its practitioners, who styled themselves men of science
(the word “scientist” was yet to be invented) or Newtonian
philosophers (after their great leader, Isaac Newton), may have
still theorized like natural philosophers, but they increasingly
acted like skilled professionals. They reasoned from first
principles but concerned themselves with the observable, the
measurable, and the practical. By the end of the eighteenth
century, they became central to Britain’s booming economy—
revolutionizing agriculture; inventing and improving engines,
pumps, and other machinery; designing and overseeing the
24
See FRANCIS BACON, THE NEW ORGANON 33-101 (Lisa Jardine & Michael
Silverthorne eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000) (1620).
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construction of waterways, bridges, and harbors.25 It was not
long before the courts were asked to consider the status of
these new experts in the courtroom.
The matter was laid squarely before the courts in the
1782 civil case of Folkes v. Chadd.26 In this celebrated legal
episode, several experts were summoned by the litigants to the
courtroom to testify before the jury to what in their opinion
caused the decay of a certain harbor on the Norfolk coast of
England.27 The testimony of one of those experts, a prominent
Newtonian philosopher named John Smeaton, was excluded by
the trial judge on the ground that his theoretical explanations
were “matter of opinion, which could be no foundation for the
verdict of the jury.”28 On appeal, Lord Mansfield, Chief Justice
of the Royal Court of King’s Bench, found the silencing of the
philosopher to be an error and granted a new trial on the
ground that Smeaton’s theory “was very proper evidence.”29
Lord Mansfield’s opinion in Folkes v. Chadd has served
in the legal literature as the principal precedent that shaped
the dominant option of using expert knowledge in the modern
adversarial courtroom—calling experts to testify before the
jury as partisan witnesses. It has been unanimously declared
“the foundation of the rules governing expert evidence.” 30
James Thayer maintained that it inaugurated the new practice
of calling experts as partisan witnesses before the jury. 31
John Wigmore claimed that it certified experts to pronounce
opinion without being personally familiar with the facts of the
case. 32 And recently, Stephan Landsman considered it “the
court’s seal of approval on the whole adversarial apparatus

25

See David P. Miller, The Usefulness of Natural Philosophy: The Royal
Society and the Culture of Practical Utility in the Later Eighteenth Century, 32 BRIT. J.
HIST. SCI. 185, 185-201 (1999); Richard Sorrenson, Towards a History of the Royal
Society in the Eighteenth Century, 50 NOTES & REC. ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON 29-46 (1996).
See generally MARGARET C. JACOB & LARRY STEWART, PRACTICAL MATTER: NEWTON’S
SCIENCE IN THE SERVICE OF INDUSTRY AND EMPIRE, 1687-1851 (2005).
26
Folkes v. Chadd, 3 Doug. 157, 99 Eng. Rep. 589 (1782).
27
Id. Doug. at 157, 99 Eng. Rep. at 589.
28
Id. Doug. at 158, 99 Eng. Rep. at 590.
29
Id. Doug. at 160, 99 Eng. Rep. at 590.
30
Anthony Kenny, The Expert in Court, 99 LAW Q. REV. 197, 199 (1983).
31
JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A SELECTION OF CASES ON EVIDENCE AT THE
COMMON LAW 672-73 (1900).
32
4 WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 1917, at 103.
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including contending experts, hypothetical questions, and jury
evaluation.”33
What follows below is a close study of Folkes v. Chadd.
The study confirms that it was indeed a moment of great
importance for the deployment of expert testimony, but for
reasons other than those so far suggested by historians. In
Folkes v. Chadd, Lord Mansfield was intent neither on
inaugurating a new practice of calling experts as partisan
witnesses before the jury nor on solving the difficulties that
awaited such practice in the adversarial courtroom. Instead,
Mansfield was trying to clarify the legal status of a nascent
species of experts—proto-scientists, who presented in court
knowledge claims whose legal status was yet to be settled.
A.

Folkes v. Chadd, Round I

During the eighteenth century a new breed of
capitalistic landlords evolved in the northern county of Norfolk,
England, anxious to experiment with new methods of farming
that would produce ever larger surpluses for sale. By the end of
the eighteenth century, Norfolk’s innovative husbandry came
to be known worldwide as the Norfolk System and its harbors
were shipping more grain than the rest of England combined.34
One of these harbors was the tidal harbor of the town of Wells.
Having no river or other inland fresh water source, Wells
Harbor had relied for centuries on the strength of the ebbing
tide to scour the rich silt that the violent tides and winds of the
North Sea constantly deposited at its bottom. Overflowing
much of the coast, the tide created a body of water covering
thousands of acres. With the ebbing of the sea, much of this
water ultimately collected in the main channel of Wells Harbor,
providing sufficient scouring to maintain its depth and safety.35
33
Stephan Landsman, Of Witches, Madmen, and Products Liability: A
Historical Survey of the Use of Expert Testimony, 13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 131, 141 (1995);
see also Kenny, supra note 30, at 199; Stephan Landsman, One Hundred Years of
Rectitude: Medical Witnesses at the Old Bailey, 1717-1817, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 445,
491 (1998).
34
NAOMI RICHES, THE AGRICULTURE REVOLUTION IN NORFOLK 15-17, 36-42,
150-52 (1967); PAUL WOODMAN BLAKE, THE NORFOLK WE LIVE IN 36 (3d ed. 1964);
Nathaniel Kent, Exported Produce of Norfolk, 22 ANNALS AGRIC. (1784-1815) 35 (1793).
35
DANIEL DEFOE, A TOUR THROUGH THE WHOLE ISLAND OF GREAT BRITAIN:
DIVIDED INTO CIRCUITS OR JOURNIES 82-84 (London, J. & F. Rivington, 7th ed. 1769);
ARTHUR W. PURCHAS, SOME HISTORY OF WELLS-NEXT-TO-THE-SEA AND DISTRICT 63
(1965); TIDAL HARBOURS COMMISSION, FIRST [AND SECOND] REPORT[S] OF THE
COMMISSIONERS PRESENTED TO BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT BY COMMAND OF HER
MAJESTY 444-66 (London, W. Cowes & Sons 1847). See generally M.J. ARMSTRONG, AN
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In the 1720s, Wells Harbor began to show signs of
decay.36 The parts of the harbor furthest from the sea became
increasingly clogged, and by mid-century the quay became
inaccessible to shipping and the greater part of the cargo had to
be carried to and from the town by lighters. Wells merchants
and the ship owners blamed the deterioration of their harbor
on some of the local landlords, who embanked and reclaimed
from the North Sea significant tracts of land on both sides of
the harbor’s main channel. These embankments, Wells
inhabitants believed, greatly weakened the body of backwater
available for scouring their harbor, thereby causing it to choke
up.37
Fearing for the loss of their livelihood, Wells’
inhabitants tried to save their harbor. They financed the
constructions of two artificial sluices that would scour the
harbor and keep it open, but to no avail. The conditions of the
harbor continued to deteriorate.38 Finally, in 1780, confident
that the embankments were the principal cause of its troubles,
the Harbor’s board of commissioners decided to take legal
action against one of the biggest landlords, whose embankment, it felt, was the most harmful to its harbor.39
The trial took place in August 1781, at the summer
Assizes in Norwich. The questions put before the jury were
whether the said embankment harmed the harbor and whether
the harm justified the cutting of the embankments.40 The trial
lasted two days. During the first day, the commissioners’
lawyers marched a long line of traditional experts to the
witness stand. Pilots, mariners, and other seamen, who had
spent their entire life at the harbor, testified from their
personal experience to the rapid deterioration of the harbor
following the construction of the said embankment. On the
ESSAY ON THE CONTOUR OF THE COAST OF NORFOLK, BUT MORE PARTICULARLY AS IT
RELATES TO THE MARUM-BANKS & SEA-BREACHES SO LOUDLY AND SO JUSTLY
COMPLAINED OF! (Norwich, Crouse & Stevenson 1789).
36
JOHN ARMSTRONG, REPORT CONCERNING THE DRAINAGE OF BEDFORD
LEVEL AND THE PORT OF KING’S LYNN (1724); THOMAS BADESLADE, THE HISTORY OF
THE ANCIENT AND PRESENT STATE OF THE NAVIGATION OF THE PORT OF KING’S-LYN,
AND OF CAMBRIDGE, AND THE REST OF THE TRADING-TOWNS IN THOSE PARTS 13-14
(London, J. Roberts 1725).
37
NATHANIEL KENT, GENERAL VIEW OF THE AGRICULTURE OF THE COUNTY OF
NORFOLK WITH OBSERVATIONS ON THE MEANS OF IMPROVEMENT 9-10 (London, C.
Macrea 1794); CUCHLAINE A.M. KING, BEACHES AND COASTS 274-75 (1959).
38
TAL GOLAN, LAWS OF MEN AND LAWS OF NATURE 9-11 (2004).
39
See id. at 11-12 (citing TIDAL HARBOURS COMMISSION, supra note 35, at
444).
40
Folkes v. Chadd, 3 Doug. 157, 157, 99 Eng. Rep. 589, 589 (1782).
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second day, it was the landlord’s lawyers’ turn. They presented
only one expert, Robert Mylne, Fellow of the Royal Society and
the owner of a thriving London-based architecture-engineering
practice.41
Before the trial, upon the invitation of the landlord, Sir
Martin Browne Folkes, Mylne traveled from London to Wells to
study its harbor.42 He concluded that the troubles of the harbor
could not be attributed to Folkes’s embankment or to any other
embankment. What caused the decay of the harbor were the
vast quantities of materials discharged at the immense western
estuaries by the six rivers of Ouse, Nene, Witham, Trent,
Wharfe, and Swale, and deposited along the north coast of
Norfolk by the strong tides and winds of the North Sea.43 The
defense experts, Mylne explained to the jury, had been misled
by their perceptions. The filling up of the harbor they had
witnessed was but a mere link in the temporal chain of causes
imperceptible to lay observation, a chain perceptible only to
those intimated with the hidden operation of nature.44
The authoritative testimony of the famous engineer and
Fellow of the Royal Society, who had made a special study of
the cause of the trial, made a strong impression on the jurors,
who, we are told, “relying on the weight of Mr. Mylne’s abilities
of knowledge, and not having the least doubt of the truth of his
evidence, found a verdict for the Folkes.”45 Wells’ inhabitants
were outraged by the arrogance of the metropolitan expert.
How could a foreigner to the county, lacking intimate
knowledge of the facts of the case, claim, on the basis of the
shortest inspection, to recognize forces at work unobserved by
their own experienced experts, who had spent their entire life
at the harbor? The commissioners’ lawyers moved for a new

41
Robert Mylne owned a thriving private architecture/engineering/surveying
practice. His specialty was bridges but his designs were various. Among other things
he was appointed architect to St. Paul’s Cathedral and chief engineer of the great New
River Company that supplied water to London. ALBERT E. RICHARDSON, ROBERT
MYLNE: ARCHITECT AND ENGINEER, 1733 TO 1811 (1955).
42
Id. at 114-16.
43
ROBERT MYLNE, MR. MYLNE’S REPORT, ON HIS SURVEY OF THE HARBOUR,
&C. OF WELLS, IN NORFOLK 4 (Apr. 28, 1781).
44
Id.
45
See GOLAN, supra note 38, at 23; Notes of the Ordering for a 2nd Trial,
Folkes, Bart & All Agst. Chadd, Esq. & Others, Norfolk Records Office, MF/RO 504/2,
MS 486 [hereinafter Notes Ordering 2nd Trial]. This was a standard legal argument
for a new trial made by a party who felt cheated by a case falsely made at the trial that
it had no reason to expect and therefore could not come prepared to answer. See, e.g.,
Hartley v. Buggin, 3 Doug. 39, 40, 99 Eng. Rep. 527, 528 (1781) (Mansfield, J.).
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trial “on the ground that the defendants were surprised by the
doctrine and reasoning of Mr. Milne.”46
The royal judges of the King’s Bench, who convened to
discuss the commissioners’ request, agreed that the
commissioners should have had the opportunity to counter
Mylne’s performance with their own experts. “[I]n matters of
science,” they dictated, “the reasonings of men of science can
only be answered by men of science.” 47 A new trial was
therefore granted and was promptly set for the following
summer term of the Norfolk assizes in July 1782. To avoid
additional surprises in this important litigation, which “has
influenced the whole county of Norfolk, and perhaps the whole
country may be affected by it,”48 the judges directed the parties
to exchange between them in writing, before the new trial, the
opinions of the experts whom they intended to produce in court
“so that both sides might be prepared to answer them.”49
B.

The Experts and Their Reports

The second round of the Wells Harbor litigation, it was
clear to all, was going to be decided upon the opinions of men of
science. Unwilling to be caught off guard again, the
commissioners of Wells Harbor went out and recruited four
senior experts—John Grundy, Joseph Nickalls, Thomas
Hogard, and Joseph Hodskinson—to represent them in the
coming trial. Grundy was an experienced engineer whose
specialties included the improvement of river navigation and
the drainage of adjacent low lands. Nickalls served as an
appointed engineer to the Thames Commissioners,
representing their cause in Parliament against loud opposition
from promoters of competing canal schemes. Hogard
specialized in fen drainage and served as a commissioner for
several fen drainage schemes in Lincolnshire. Hodskinson was
Vice-President of the Society of Civil Engineering and one of
the most respected land-surveyors in England. No doubt, the
commissioners of Wells Harbor prepared themselves well for
the coming scientific battle.50
46

Folkes, 3 Doug. at 157, 99 Eng. Rep. at 589.
Id. Doug. at 159, 99 Eng. Rep. at 590.
48
See GOLAN, supra note 38, at 24 (citing Notes Ordering 2nd Trial, supra
note 45, at 67).
49
Folkes, 3 Doug. at 157.
50
See JOHN SMEATON, FRS 25-26 (A.W. Skempton ed., 1981) [hereinafter
Skempton, JOHN SMEATON]; GARTH WATSON, THE SMEATONIANS 3-21 (1989). See
47
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Sir Martin Browne Folkes added just one more expert to
his team. But he chose exceptionally well. His expert was
John Smeaton—Fellow of the Royal Society and a civil engineer
who was considered the highest authority on harbors in the
kingdom.51 By 1781, Smeaton had been consulted on more than
thirty different harbors in England and Scotland.52 Furthermore, he was responsible for the recent successful rescue of
Ramsgate Harbor, one of England’s largest harbors, from the
vast amounts of sand that threatened to choke it completely.53
In addition to his flourishing engineering practice, Smeaton
also developed a prominent scientific career. Smeaton had
contributed fifteen papers to the Royal Society’s Philosophical
Transactions. One of them, describing his experiments with
waterwheels and windmills, was awarded the Copley Medal,
the society’s highest award, thereby establishing Smeaton’s
reputation as one of the Kingdom’s most celebrated natural
philosophers.54
In March 1782, Smeaton traveled to Wells and spent
three days there studying the harbor. Then, he returned to
London to study further the history of the harbor, read the
evidence produced in the first trial, and write his report.55 Like
Mylne before him, Smeaton also concluded that the decay of
Wells Harbor was caused not by the hand of man but by the
hidden hand of nature. “To have a clear and comprehensive
view of the cause of [the] decay,” Smeaton wrote, “it will be
necessary to shew the natural causes by which the port of
generally A.W. Skempton, The Engineering Works of John Grundy, in 19
LINCOLNSHIRE HIST. & ARCHAEOLOGY 65 (1984); A.W. Skempton & Esther Clark
Wright, Early Members of the Smeatonian Society of Civil Engineering, 44
TRANSACTIONS NEWCOMEN SOC’Y 23 (1971-72).
51
M. Dixon, Some Account of the Life, Character, and Works, of Mr. John
Smeaton, F.R.S., in 1 REPORTS OF THE LATE JOHN SMEATON, F.R.S. xv-xxx (London,
Longman et al., 2d ed. 1837) [hereinafter SMEATON REPORTS]; see Skempton, JOHN
SMEATON, supra note 50, at 27-34.
52
Among the harbors were Whitehaven, Workington, and Bristol on the west
coast; Christchurch, Rye, and Dover on the south; Yarmouth, Lynn, Wisebeach,
Scarborough, and Sunderland on the east; and Aberdeen, Dundee, and Dunbar in
Scotland. SAMUEL SMILES, LIVES OF THE ENGINEERS, WITH AN ACCOUNT OF THEIR
PRINCIPAL WORKS 63-73 (London, John Murray 1861).
53
SMILES, supra note 52, at 65-70.
54
J. Smeaton, An Experimental Enquiry Concerning the Natural Powers of
Water and Wind to Turn Mills, and other Machines, Depending on a Circular Motion,
in 51 PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS, GIVING SOME ACCOUNT OF THE PRESENT
UNDERTAKINGS, STUDIES AND LABOURS, OF THE INGENIOUS, IN MANY CONSIDERABLE
PARTS OF THE WORLD 100-74 (London, L. Davis & C. Reymers 1760).
55
JOHN BARNEY, THE TRIALS OF WELLS HARBOUR 15-16 (2000); Skempton,
JOHN SMEATON, supra note 50, at 28-29; 3 SMEATON REPORTS, supra note 51, at 18.
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Wells has been formed.”56 Thus, Smeaton commenced with a
theoretical discussion concerning the general principles that
govern the creation and decay of tidal harbors by the natural
forces of the sea and the weather.
There was a time, Smeaton hypothesized, when nothing
more than naked sand lay against the bare coast upon which
the town of Wells stood. At that stage, the tide flowed and
ebbed uniformly as a continuous sheet of water. But as the
steady deposition of tidal silt increased the height of the sand,
tidal waters were eventually left behind that started to cut
gullies on their way back to the sea. As the land steadily
increased in height, greater bodies of water were left on it and
the gullies increased in number, depth, and size. Eventually,
Smeaton wrote:
[I]f all were ultimately collected into one, as has been the case with
the channel of Wells Harbor, the scour would be sufficient to
maintain a channel through which vessels might be brought from
the sea, and thus an useful harbour would be formed, which would
increase in depth and utility by the continuance of the forming
powers, but yet, only to a certain degree.57

With the continual elevation of the coast above the
reach of higher and higher tides, a height would eventually be
reached from which the process would start to reverse itself.
The volume of the water left upon the coast would start to
diminish. Deprived of the scouring action of the backwater,
first the gullies and finally the main channel would be choked.
The true story of Wells Harbor, then, Smeaton recounted in his
report, was that
the progressional operation of nature, which originally formed the
harbour of Wells and brought it to maturity, has also occasioned it to
grow more and more into a state of decay; and will finally close it up,
and convert into a firm ground, fit for arable purposes, and those of
pasturage, the very spot where ships have rode at anchor . . . .58

Two
weeks
after
Smeaton’s
departure,
the
Commissioners’ scientific team also arrived to Wells and spent
ten days there, inspecting the harbor and its surroundings.59
They did not bother themselves with the general laws
governing the dynamics of tidal harbors. That would have been
56
57
58
59

2 SMEATON REPORTS, supra note 51, at 149.
Id. at 151.
Id. at 157.
See GOLAN, supra note 38, at 26, 32-34.
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to play the part of the natural philosopher. They were civil
engineers, practical men whose business was to estimate the
relative effectiveness of the backwater deprived by Folkes’s
embankment. To that end, they concerned themselves with the
mappings, measurements, and calculations of the current state
of the land; its existing areas, enclosed or not; the locations and
orientations of the neighboring creeks; the length and the
depth of the main channel; the directions of the winds and the
tides; etc.60
Back in London, Hodskinson promptly delivered a
detailed report to his employers. While Smeaton based his
report on his dynamic theory of the tidal harbors, Hodskinson
grounded his on interviews with the local harbor masters and
on observations and measurements his team had made. The
interviews convinced him that within local memory not only
had the coast not grown in breadth or height, but, on the
contrary, the sea had gained in many places along the coast.
His copious calculations showed that Folkes’s embankment
eliminated 214,122 tons of water, about a third of the volume of
water previously available for scouring the harbor.61 Hodskinson concluded:
Upon the whole, I am of opinion that the present bad and ruinous
state of the harbor is to be in a great measure, if not wholly, imputed
to the [said] embankment . . . and that if the tide of the sea is
permitted to flow and reflow in its ancient course and manner . . .,
the navigation will be supported and maintained in a safe, useful
and commodious state by the natural operation of the tidal waters
thereon.62

C.

Folkes v. Chadd, Round II

The second round of the Wells Harbor litigation began
on July 25, 1782, before Henry Gould, Chief Justice of the
Royal Court of Common Pleas, and a special jury. Two eminent
counsels ran the trial. Leading the legal team for Folkes,
unchanged from the previous trial, was Henry Partridge, a
well-known barrister with strong Norfolk connections. This
time the commissioners of Wells Harbor brought their own
heavy legal artillery in the person of George Hardinge,
60
See Joseph Hodskinson, Report on the State and Causes of the Decay of
Wells Harbor to the Commissioners for the Preservation of the Harbor of Wells, in TIDAL
HARBOURS COMMISSION, supra note 35, at 446-49.
61
See GOLAN, supra note 38, at 32-33.
62
Hodskinson, supra note 60, at 449.
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Barrister of the Middle Temple and solicitor-general to Queen
Charlotte.63
The reports of the experts on both sides were made
available to the jury a week before the trial. However, when
the trial began, Hardinge chose not to call upon his experts to
give oral testimony and be cross-examined. Instead, he
summoned a long line of mariners and navigators to testify
from their personal experience to the rapid deterioration of
their harbor. Partridge, on the other hand, planned to repeat
his successful strategy and summon his famous scientific
expert to the witness stand to persuade the jury that it was
nature, not his employer’s embankment, that was responsible
for Wells Harbor’s troubles. However, when Partridge tried to
call Smeaton to the stand, Hardinge objected. The illustrious
Smeaton, Hardinge contended, should not be permitted to
speak to the jury since his testimony concerning the hidden
causes of nature “was matter of opinion, which could be no
foundation for the verdict of the jury, which was to be built
entirely on facts, and not on opinions.”64
Hardinge’s objection was characteristic of the
evidentiary battles that flourished in the new adversarial
courtroom.65 Central to these battles was the opinion doctrine,
which sought to restrict witnesses from expressing their
opinions where the subject matter was susceptible to factual
statements. As John Wigmore summarized the status of the
new opinion doctrine at the end of the eighteenth century:
“[H]enceforth, the only question can be how far there are to be
specific exceptions to it.”66 It was with this question in mind
that Chief Justice Gould addressed Hardinge’s objection to
Smeaton’s testimony.
Smeaton’s case seemed straightforward. He was a wellrespected expert and the facts of the Wells Harbor case, which
he had observed directly, fell well within his field of expertise,
thus constituting a proper object for his expert opinion.
Nevertheless, the defense counsel, Hardinge, had firm legal
63

See entry for “George Hardinge,” in DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY

(1995).
64

Folkes v. Chadd, 3 Doug. 157, 158, 99 Eng. Rep. 589, 590 (1782).
Hand, supra note 2, at 37; Landsman, supra note 14, at 572.
66
Wigmore, supra note 19, at 448. Collecting his data from political state
trials, Wigmore may have overstated the status of the opinion doctrine in non-political
criminal and civil proceedings. In 1782, while no longer embryonic, the opinion doctrine
was still subject to the wide discretion of the individual trial judge. See Hand, supra
note 2, at 45; Landsman, supra note 14, at 572; Gallanis, supra note 17, at 512-13, 530.
65
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ground to stand upon when he maintained that Smeaton’s
opinion did not rest on the facts of the case but on speculation
that had no place in court. Smeaton, Hardinge argued,
transgressed the established legal range of expertise. Expert
opinions were supposed to be based on calculations and
empirical observations, readily traceable to the particular
training and experience of the particular expert pronouncing
them. Smeaton, on the other hand, propounded in court a highminded hypothesis about some natural processes, imperceptible to anyone but himself, which allowed him to shift the
blame for the undisputed decay of the harbor from the obvious
human hand of his employers to the hidden hand of nature.
But what kind of training or experience could have qualified a
person like Smeaton in 1782 as an authority on such matters?
And what kind of legal reasoning could acknowledge such
latent causes as a proper foundation for the verdict of the jury,
which was to be built entirely on facts presented before them in
court?
Descending from a long legal lineage, the seventy-twoyear-old Chief Justice Gould was known for the strictness of his
law. 67 His logic, the logic of the common law, suspected
elegantly constructed theories and stressed the importance of
empirical data in processes of proof. Yet, Smeaton’s evidence
was based on a hypothetical natural process that could have
taken centuries and could not be measured, tested, or
otherwise verified. Thus, Chief Justice Gould accepted
Hardinge’s argument that Smeaton’s evidence indeed “could be
no foundation for the verdict of the jury” and did not permit
Smeaton to address the jury from the witness stand.68 With
Smeaton and his imponderable science out of the way,
Hardinge won the day as the jury gave a verdict for the
commissioners, allowing them to cut the embankment that
choked their harbor.69 Folkes’s lawyers immediately asked for a
new trial on the grounds that their expert was improperly
silenced.70

67

See “Gould, Henry,” in EDWARD FOSS, BIOGRAPHIA JURIDICA: A BIOGRAPHCONQUEST TO THE PRESENT

ICAL DICTIONARY OF THE JUDGES OF ENGLAND FROM THE
TIME 1066-1870, at 308 (London, John Murray 1870).
68
69
70

Folkes, 3 Doug. at 158, 99 Eng. Rep. at 590.
Id.
See id.
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Mansfield’s Decision

The request for a third trial was laid before Lord
Mansfield, Chief Justice of the King’s Bench and probably the
most influential judicial figure of the eighteenth century.71 His
famous decision is worthy of a lengthy quotation:
The facts in this case are not disputed. In 1758 the bank was
erected, and soon afterwards the harbor went to decay. The question
is, to what has this decay been owing? The defendant says, to this
bank. Why? Because it prevents the back-water. That is matter of
opinion:—the whole case is a question of opinion from the facts
agreed upon. Nobody can swear that it was the cause; nobody
thought that it would produce this mischief when the bank was
erected. The commissioners themselves look on for above twenty
years . . . . It is a matter of judgment, what has hurt the harbour.
The plaintiff says that the bank was not the occasion of it. . . . Mr.
Smeaton is called. A confusion now arises from a misapplication of
terms. It is objected that Mr. Smeaton is going to speak, not as to
facts, but as to opinion. That opinion, however, is deduced from facts
which are not disputed—the situation of banks, the course of tides
and winds, and the shifting of sands . . . Mr. Smeaton understands
the construction of harbours, the causes of their destruction, and
how remedied. In matters of science no other witnesses can be called.
An instance frequently occurs in actions of unskillfully navigating
ships. The question then depends on the evidence of those who
understand such matters; and when such questions come before me,
I always send for some of the brethren of Trinity House. I cannot
believe that where the question is, whether a defect arises from a
natural or an artificial cause, the opinions of men of science are not
to be received. . . . I have myself received the opinion of Mr. Smeaton
respecting mills, as a matter of science. The cause of the decay of the
harbor is also a matter of science, and still more so, whether the
removal of the bank can be beneficial. Of this, such men as Mr.
Smeaton alone can judge. Therefore we are of opinion that his
judgment, formed on facts, was very proper evidence.72

Mansfield’s decision has long served as the origin story for the
rise of partisan expert testimony in the modern AngloAmerican legal system. The first report on Folkes v. Chadd was
published in 1831, as edited by Henry Roscoe, an experienced
barrister who based his reports on the records of various
leading judges. According to Roscoe, early nineteenth-century
courts regarded Mansfield’s decision as “the principal case on

71

See 1 JAMES OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH OF
ENGLISH LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 3-7 (1992) [hereinafter THE MANSFIELD
MANUSCRIPTS].
72
Folkes, 3 Doug. at 158-59, 99 Eng. Rep. at 590.
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the admissibility of matter of opinion.” 73 Roscoe further
elaborated on what was to be learned from Mansfield’s
decision: “Professional men, when examined on the subject of
their art or science, are of necessity allowed to state their
opinions . . . .”74
The next significant reference to Folkes v. Chadd came
sixty years later from Professor James Thayer of Harvard Law
School. Mansfield’s decision, Thayer explained, represented the
onset of judicial recognition in the modern practice of partycalled expertise. Introducing Folkes in his influential textbook,
Thayer wrote that, for a long time, “experts were thought of in
the old way, as being helpers of the court . . . . But at last the
modern conception came in, which regards the expert as
testifying, like other witnesses, directly to the jury.”75
One difficulty with Thayer’s reading of Mansfield’s
decision lies in the fact that the practice of party-called
expertise was not novel in 1782. As early as 1678, some of the
most eminent physicians in the Kingdom, including future
president of the Royal Society Sir Hans Sloan, were called by
both sides to testify in a murder case, as to the causes of
certain symptoms observed in an autopsy and on the general
proposition as to whether a man could die of wounds without a
fever.76 In the eighteenth century, party-called expertise was
also documented in civil proceedings, noticeably in the growing
area of patent litigation. The practice was recurrent in the
growing textile trade during the 1760s and 1770s. 77 Tax
litigation and nuisance litigation also saw the deployment of
party-called expertise with intense adversarial spirit.78 Indeed,
Lord Mansfield himself had presided over many patent trials
and was well familiar with the practice of party-called
expertise. In the 1760s, for example, he presided over an
73

See Folkes, 3 Doug. at 160 n.(b).
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1758-1830: A STUDY OF THE EARLY FACTORY SYSTEM 41-46, 81-83 (1958).
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important patent case that involved a prominent London
optician, Peter Dollond, and a group of other London opticians,
in a struggle for patent rights for the design of the refracting
telescope.79 The case brought to the witness stand a line of
experts, who testified to optical principles, previous designs,
and trade secrets involved. 80 In the summer of 1781,
concomitantly with the Wells Harbor litigation, Lord Mansfield
presided over another important case involving expert
testimony—one which revolved around Richard Arkwright’s
attempt to enforce his monopoly of the carding machine on the
textile business. The attempt failed, but a second one
succeeded in 1785, largely thanks to the testimony of scientific
figures such as William Herschel, Erasmus Darwin, James
Watt, and Robert Mylne, who vouched under oath to the
validity of the patent’s principle and specifications.81
The practice of party-called expertise was therefore not
new in 1782. Still, one could maintain that the adversarial
context was novel, and that Mansfield’s decision was the first
to recognize and legitimate the practice in this new context.
However, little in Mansfield’s decision could support such
claim. In fact, Mansfield’s decision displayed a complete
disregard to Smeaton’s appearance as a partisan witness. If
anything, Mansfield’s opinion treated Smeaton as if he was a
court expert. “When such questions come before me,” Mansfield
reasoned, “I always send for some brethren of Trinity House.”82
The Trinity House was a famous club of retired sea captains,
and its brethren functioned as arbitrators and official court
experts in cases arising out of events on the high seas. 83
79

Richard Sorrenson, Dollond & Son’s Pursuit of Achromaticity, 1758-1789,
39 HIST. SCI. 31, 41-43, 41 n.40 (2001), available at http://www.shpltd.co.uk/sorrensondollond.pdf.
80
Id. at 41.
81
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Arkwright Patent Trials, 28 TECH. & CULTURE 80-86 (1987) (citing RICHARD
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Folkes v. Chadd, 3 Doug. 157, 159, 99 Eng. Rep. 589, 590 (1782).
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Clearly, the deployment of court-nominated experts is not the
precedent one would choose if intent on inaugurating a new
practice of calling experts as partisan witnesses selected and
paid for by the parties.
John Henry Wigmore, Thayer’s student and the leading
early twentieth-century authority on evidence, also saw an
origin story at the bottom of Folkes v. Chadd. Wigmore was
aware that the practice of party-called expertise was not new to
the period.84 He also recognized that expert witnesses were yet
to be differentiated from lay witnesses, who were also allowed
to testify to their opinions, especially if they were based on an
intimate knowledge of the facts of the case. 85 Wigmore
concluded therefore that the distinctiveness of the modern
expert witness sprang not from the license to testify to opinion
(which was still shared with lay witnesses), but from the
exclusive privilege to pronounce an opinion whether or not the
expert had observed the facts of the case directly.86 It was this
distinction, according to Wigmore, which made its first
successful appearance in Mansfield’s decision in Folkes v.
Chadd:
Here was a man [Smeaton], who had never seen the place, had no
“facts” to add, and was going to give . . . his opinion upon the general
question in doubt, the cause of the decay. Why should he do this?
Why waste time in listening to numbers of such persons when the
twelve men in the box have been specially selected for the very
purpose of having their opinions serve as decisive? There would be
only one reason for listening to such outside opinions, namely, that
the witness was such a person that the jury would be really aided by
his opinion.87

Thus, Wigmore claimed, Mansfield’s decision epitomized “the
general recognition by the end of the 1700s, that there was a
class of persons, i.e., those skilled in matters of science, who,
though they personally knew nothing about the circumstances
of the particular case, might yet, perhaps by way of exception,
give their opinion on the matter.”88
Wigmore, we know, had his facts wrong. Smeaton not
only had seen the place, but had also written a detailed report
on his findings that had been accepted by the court as primary
84
85
86
87
88

WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 1917, at 101-02.
Id. at 102.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 105-06.
Id. at 103.
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evidence. But if Mansfield’s decision was neither about
inaugurating a new practice of calling experts as partisan
witnesses before the jury, as Thayer maintained, nor about
allowing experts to pronounce opinion without being personally
familiar with the facts of the case, as Wigmore maintained,
then what was it about? What was the issue that Lord
Mansfield tried to winnow from the chaff of the protracted
litigation?
Having reconstructed the facts of the case, we are now
able to propose an answer to this question. Lord Mansfield, just
like Chief Justice Gould before him, was trying to decide the
merits of Hardinge’s objection, which pitted men of science in
the old sense (that is, men of large and tested experience)
against men of science in the new sense (that is, Newtonian
philosophers), who based their opinions on their privileged
knowledge of the imponderable laws of nature. Mansfield’s
decision delivered therefore the authoritative interpretation of
the King’s Bench concerning the implications of the nascent
opinion doctrine for experts like Smeaton and Mylne, protoscientists who functioned like skilled professionals but
cogitated like natural philosophers.
The Wells Harbor litigation therefore did constitute an
important historical moment in the deployment of expert
knowledge in the courtroom, but for reasons different from
those so far suggested. It was a junction in which the
expanding late eighteenth-century cultures of law and science
finally crossed paths. The lawyers had been solidifying their
control over the production and presentation of evidence in the
legal courtroom. Meanwhile, natural philosophy had become a
competent branch of applicable knowledge. A noted Newtonian,
Smeaton presented a conspicuous example of the growing
importance of natural philosophy as a useful pursuit. For
example, his experimental studies of waterwheels, the most
important source of energy during the early stages of the
industrial revolution, revolutionized their design and improved
their performance by over thirty percent.89 Thus, although late
eighteenth-century Englishmen may have still considered the
opinions of natural philosophers to be less than facts, they
nevertheless were already more than mere opinions. That was
also the case concerning the causes behind matters such as the
89
Terry S. Reynolds, Scientific Influences on Technology: The Case of the
Overshot Waterwheel, 1752-1754, 20 TECH. & CULTURE 270-95 (1979).
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decay of harbors, which had been traditionally a matter for the
experience of the craftsmen and artisans who had built them.
By 1782, as Mansfield made certain to clarify in his decision,
these causes were already a “matter of science [about which]
such men as Mr. Smeaton alone can judge.”90
Wigmore was therefore right when he considered
Mansfield’s decision as illustrating the growing legal
recognition by the end of the eighteenth century that there was
a new class of witnesses, skilled in matters of science, who
could give opinions that were not based directly on the
traditional trustworthiness of the senses. However, this lack of
positive first-hand evidence was not merely a contingent
deficiency occasioned by the experts’ failure to personally
inspect the facts of the case. Rather, it was an inevitable
consequence of the knowledge these new experts brought to the
courts, knowledge that often claimed to be based on the
imponderables of nature, which “nothing but the most
philosophic eye, by reasoning upon chain of facts, is able to
discover.”91
Hardinge’s objection to Smeaton’s testimony forced the
chief justices of the two central royal courts to reflect on the
epistemological status of this new style of scientific reasoning
and on the status of its bearers in the courtroom. Gould, the
conservative, chose to remain within the guarded line
delineated by the evolving rules of evidence and excluded
Smeaton’s theory for not being clearly reducible to hard and
concrete evidence. This formalist approach, which denied the
court the services of the most respected expert on the issue
upon which the whole litigation turned, made no sense to
Mansfield. “I cannot believe,” he remarked, “that when the
question is, whether a defect arises from a natural or an
artificial cause, the opinions of men of science are not to be
received . . . .”92 Mansfield declared, therefore, that the opinions
of men of science were an exception to the opinion doctrine.
Unwilling to distinguish one science from the other, Mansfield
measured professional reputation instead. If the proposed
witness was known as an expert on the matter before the court,
Mansfield prescribed, his opinion was proper evidence.93
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Smeaton’s appearance as a partisan witness for hire
played no part in Mansfield’s decision. This disregard was also
typical of other leading rulings from the late-eighteenth and
early-nineteenth centuries. One is pressed to find in them
judicial angst about the growing practice of calling experts as
partisan witnesses. One may wonder then: Could it be that
the experienced royal judges overlooked the difficulties that
might await the deployment of partisan expertise in the new
adversarial courtroom? Why did they not try to mold a
procedure that would keep expert advice out of the adversarial
fire?
The answer, I would like to suggest, is that late
eighteenth-century judges counted upon men of science to give,
by ties of honor, unbiased opinions on matters beyond the ken
of the jurors. The scientific community had long adopted the
gentlemanly code of honor as a necessary condition for the
reliability of the scientific discourse. Gentlemen were bound to
credit the word of their fellows. The status of the gentleman—
his economic independence, the freedom of his actions, the
moral discipline he imposed upon himself—guaranteed the
credibility of his word.94 This social contract worked both ways.
Nothing ruined gentlemanly status quicker than dishonesty.
John Locke gave notice in his 1690 guide to the education of
English gentlemen:
[T]wenty faults are sooner to be forgiven, than the straining of truth,
to cover any one by an excuse. . . . [Lying was] a quality so wholly
inconsistent with the name and character of a gentleman, that
nobody of any credit can bear the imputation of a lye; a mark that is
judged the utmost disgrace, which debases a man to the lowest
degree of a shameful manners, and ranks him with the most
contemptible part of mankind, and the abhorred rascality, and it is
not to endure by anyone, who would converse with people of
condition, or have any esteem or reputation in the world.95

It was noted that among the seventeenth-century members of
the Royal Society, “the far greater Number are Gentlemen, free
and unconfine’d.”96 During the eighteenth century, the Royal
94

See generally PHILIP MASON, THE ENGLISH GENTLEMAN: THE RISE AND
FALL OF AN IDEAL (1982); SIMON RAVEN, THE ENGLISH GENTLEMAN (1961); Peter Dear,
Totius in Verba: Rhetoric and Authority in the Early Royal Society, 76 ISIS 145 (1985).
95
JOHN LOCKE, SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION §§ 131, 139 (1692)
(paragraph break omitted) (quoted in STEVEN SHAPIN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF TRUTH:
CIVILITY AND SCIENCE IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 74 (1995)).
96
THOMAS SPRAT, THE HISTORY OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF LONDON FOR THE
IMPROVING OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE 67 (J. Knapton et al. eds., 3d ed. 1722).
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Society continued to strengthen its status as a body of
disinterested gentlemen who impartially investigated nature
and toil for no end but the improvement of public good.97 The
royal judges therefore were not worried about the behavior of
these new experts and trusted that their testimony would
correspond to their true opinions.98
In retrospect, one can only appreciate the irony in this
late eighteenth-century judicial leniency towards the new
partisan role men of science took as witnesses in the modern
adversarial courtroom. This leniency seems to carry the mark
of the aloofness of the eighteenth-century judiciary, who
dominated the courtroom to such an extent that they could not
imagine it otherwise—that a time may come when their
judicial powers would no longer suffice to control the play of
partisan expertise in the courtroom. They were soon proven
wrong. The tremendous nineteenth-century expansion of
science and technology into industry and other public sectors
quickly established the scientific expert as a pivotal figure in
the courtroom and turned partisan expert testimony into an
acrimonious and persistent thorn in the side of the common
law. We will attend to these developments in the next two
sections.
III.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY
IN ENGLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The 1782 contest of expertise over the implications of
the tide for Wells Harbor and Lord Mansfield’s subsequent
decision to allow opinion testimony given by men of science to
lay anchor in the courtroom were signs of the time—the time of
the Industrial Revolution and the rising tide it brought of legal
cases involving technological and scientific argumentation.
Thus, during the early nineteenth century, among the crowd of
experts who were allowed into the witness stand, besides the
traditional figures of the physician, the merchant, and the sea
captain, we find the growing presence of men of science—
chemists, microscopists, geologists, engineers, mechanists, etc.
97

See generally Miller, supra note 25.
The circumstances of Folkes v. Chadd provided a good example of this
judicial trust. Mylne and Smeaton were elite members of the Royal Society. Lord
Mansfield had previously benefited from their expert services and respected them
enormously. Clearly, he was not worried that they would testify dishonorably. They
were men of honor and their integrity guaranteed the truthfulness of their stories. See
GOLAN, supra note 38, at 51; Notes Ordering 2nd Trial, supra note 45, at 67.
98
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These experts untangled for the court and the jury the
complexities of the growing number of cases involving science,
in fields ranging from insurance, mining, and energy to
toxicology, patents, and even regulation. They appraised the
disputed claims with their experimental techniques and offered
their knowledge of the principles of nature, which the jurors
then could apply to the facts at issue before them.99
The growing judicial recognition of this special class of
witnesses was not all good news for this rising species of
experts. It may have underlined the experts’ growing
importance to the judicial process, but at the same time it
perpetuated their marginalization within this process. Moving
across professional and institutional boundaries, from the
exclusivity of their lecture theaters, private laboratories, and
societies to the public courtroom, men of science hoped to
represent laws that were not controlled by human whim.
Instead, they found themselves manipulated as mere tools in
the hands of the lawyers. As members of the jury or as advisors
to the court, they were independent and active participants in
the legal decision-making process. As witnesses, they found
themselves isolated in the witness box, away from the decisionmaking processes. Browbeaten and set against each other, they
found their standard strategies for generating credibility and
agreement unfitted for the adversarial heat of the courtroom.
The result was a continuous parade of leading men of science
zealously contradicting each other from the witness stand—a
parade that started to cast serious doubts on their integrity
and on their science in the eyes of the legal profession and the
public.
A.

Severn, King and Co. v. Imperial Insurance Co.

All this was clearly on display during a large insurance
litigation in the early nineteenth century.100 The case was a fire
damage claim made in 1820 by the owners of a large sugar
factory in London against four insurance companies. Shortly
before the fire, the factory introduced a new process that
pumped hot whale oil through copper coils immersed in the
99

For detailed analyses of many of these cases, see GOLAN, supra note 38, at

52-106.
100
The ensuing description of this case is drawn largely from June Z. Fullmer,
Technology, Chemistry, and the Law in Early Nineteenth-Century England, 21 TECH. &
CULTURE 1 (1980), and from the London Times; see also GOLAN, supra note 38, at 5470.
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sugar pans to boil the sugar solution. The insurance companies
argued that the new process, the use of which had not been
reported to them, introduced an increased risk of fire that
voided the terms of their policies. The ensuing litigation
revolved therefore around the little known characteristics of
whale oil and its behavior under frequent application of intense
heat.
Both sides of the litigation built their strategies upon
scientific expert evidence. Virtually every notable chemist and
chemical technologist in the kingdom was recruited by one of
the parties. The scientific team for the sugar factory included
the likes of John Dalton, President of the Manchester Literary
and Philosophical Society and the author of the first useful
atomic theory of matter; William Brande, Secretary of the
Royal Society and Sir Humphry Davy’s successor as professor
of chemistry at the Royal Institution; Thomas Thomson, a
professor of chemistry at the University of Glasgow, editor of
Annals of Philosophy, and the author of the influential System
of Chemistry; as well as many other top men of science. One by
one, the members of this dream team stepped onto the witness
stand and swore for the plaintiffs that the new process was
infinitely less dangerous than the old process, in which the
sugar solution was heated over open fire.101
The insurance companies put together a scientific team
no less formidable. It included the likes of Michael Faraday,
chemical operator at the Royal Institution; Arthur Aikin,
Secretary to the Society for the Encouragement of the Arts and
the author of the Dictionary of Chemistry; Richard Phillips,
professor of chemistry at the Royal Military College and
chairman of the London Chemical Society, and many more.
These experts testified under oath that the new heating
process was extremely dangerous because the repeated heating
and cooling altered the nature of the whale oil, making it
increasingly volatile and producing highly flammable gases apt
to explode.102
Both teams of experts made sure to back up their
opinions with results from experiments, many of them
performed especially for the trial. Alas, the experimental
results presented by the two sides were completely
contradictory. While the plaintiff’s experts described smooth
101
102

See GOLAN, supra note 38, at 56-59.
See id. at 59-62.
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operation under all conditions, the defense experts described
gusts of fire, combustive vapors, and sudden explosions.
Charging the jury, the presiding judge, Chief Justice Lord
Dallas, could not hide his utter frustration:
[T]hey [the jurors] had heard the evidence, he [Dallas] would not say
of the most intelligent, but of as intelligent men in chymical and
scientific pursuits as were to be found in this country or in Europe.
He had himself read the works of some of them, had derived
pleasure from their labours, and entertained the greatest respect for
their talents and information. But they had, nevertheless, left the
Court in a state of utter uncertainty; and the two days during which
the results of their experiments had been brought into comparison,
were days, not of triumph, but of humiliation to science.103

Dallas advised the jury to throw “the contradictory results of
experiment” out the window, and stated his disgust from the
partisanship that had been displayed during the trial. 104 “It
must be a matter of general regret,” he said, “to find the
respectable witnesses to whom he was alluding drawn up, not
on one side, and for the maintenance of the same truths, but,
as it were, in martial and hostile array against each other.”105
The jury found a full verdict for the factory owners and
the Imperial Insurance Company moved for a new trial on the
ground that the verdict went against the weight of the
evidence.106 Discussing the appeal, the judges of the Court of
Common Pleas approved the request but decided to delay the
new trial “till one of the other causes [that is, the suits against
the other three insurance companies] should also have been
tried, and the result of certain proposed experiments affecting
the point in dispute be made known.”107 The judges, it seems,
were hoping that further investigation would allow the
chemists to clarify their evidence and offer the jury a better
basis on which to draw an informed conclusion in this
important litigation, which involved not only large sums of
money but also the general practice and principles by which
fire insurance was regulated.
The stakes were therefore raised for the next trial,
against the Phoenix Insurance Company. All parties were well
aware that the results would affect not only the renewed trial
103
104
105
106
107

Court of Common Pleas, TIMES (London), Apr. 14, 1820, at 3.
Id.
Id.
Fullmer, supra note 100, at 18.
See Severn v. Olive, 3 Brod. & B. 72, 72, 23 Eng. Rep. 1209, 1209 (1821).
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of the first case, but also two other suits still waiting in the
wings. Both parties recruited therefore even larger crowds of
scientific experts and doubled their efforts to produce convincing experimental data. Alas, the experts and their evidence
remained as contradictory as they were in the first trial. Chief
Justice Lord Dallas, again, did not hide his distress in his
charge to the jury:
A vast body of evidence had been laid before the jury; medical men,
chymical men, eminent men in every department of science, had
been examined in the course of the trial; but what was the
lamentable result? The jury had heard of opinion opposed to opinion,
judgment to judgment, theory to theory, and what was still more
extraordinary, they had seen the same experiments producing
opposite results. Who should decide this mighty controversy?
He [Dallas] professed himself unable to give an opinion. He was
not unacquainted with scientific subjects, but the little he knew
only convinced him how much was beyond the reach of his
knowledge . . . . This he would say of science in its present state, that
all that belonged to the theory was doubtful, and that all that rested
on experiment was new.”108

The jury, again, gave full verdict for the plaintiffs, and
the insurance companies were directed to honor their policies
and compensate the factory owners for their trial costs.
However, the insurance company refused to pay the cost of the
plaintiffs’ experts. Legal precedent entitled only professional
men to be compensated for their time and efforts, and the
insurance companies argued that the plaintiffs’ experts did not
fall within this category, but belonged instead to the legal
category of “men of skill,” which included artisan-like experts
(mechanics, navigators, etc.), who were not entitled to be
compensated for their troubles and time.109
A third legal round took place, therefore, which revolved
around the professional status of the scientific experts involved
in the trial. The standard was set by the two established
professions—medicine and law—upper-class oriented vocations
defined by highly formal and specialized trainings. Alas, the
welter of experts produced in the trial professed none of these
traits. Socially they were faceless; intellectually they had just
been proved incoherent; and their expertise was not based on
any regulated training but rather self-taught. Thus, it was not
without a gleeful undertone of score settling that Chief Justice
108
109

Court of Common Pleas, TIMES (London), Dec. 19, at 3.
Severn, 3 Brod. & B. at 73-75, 23 Eng. Rep. at 1210-11.
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Dallas refused to recognize them as professionals. It took
chemistry another sixty-five years to reverse this perception.110
B.

Gillespie v. Russell

The courts may have been unwilling for most of the
nineteenth century to recognize men of science as professionals
and compensate them accordingly, but there were plenty of
others who were ready to pay them for their services in court.111
Thus, the presence of scientific experts in the courtroom
continued to grow, and with it the embarrassing display of
disarrayed definitions, inconsistent experimental results, and
contradictory opinions. Such cases disturbed the courts
deeply.112 The royal judges were not naive. They were ready to
tolerate, to a certain degree, the difference of opinion among
the scientific experts. Whether a fever that raged in a certain
neighborhood was or was not caused by the fumes of a factory
in the vicinity was a matter which admitted no demonstration
and was considered therefore to be a speculation admitted as
evidence only out of a necessity because no one else was
qualified to give a better opinion. Experimental evidence was a
different story, however. It was considered to be among the
surest species of evidence, and the judges found it exceedingly
difficult to accept the fact that similar experimental procedures
were constantly producing antithetical results when conducted
by opposed experts. Such conflicting experimental results, they
believed, represented the partisanship of the men of science
who produced them, and since these men were highly paid for
their services, their conduct was seen as the prostitution of
their science, of selling its credibility to the highest bidder.
Thus, as the century advanced and the legal use of
scientific expertise grew exponentially, the court began to
develop a skeptical view not only toward the opinions of the
scientific experts but also toward their data—not because
nature could lie, but because its representatives could. Indeed,
by mid-century the judiciary no longer expected further
scientific investigations to clarify the issues before the court.

110
Fullmer, supra note 100 at 24-25; COLIN A. RUSSEL, EDWARD FRANKLAND:
CHEMISTRY, CONTROVERSY AND CONSPIRACY IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND 445-57 (1996).
111
See GOLAN, supra note 38, at 81.
112
For examples from numerous cases, see GOLAN, supra note 38, at 52-106.
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Gillespie v. Russell, heard in 1853 in Edinburgh’s Court of
Session, provides an example of this change in legal mood.113
In 1850, William Gillespie, a Scottish landowner, sold
James Russell and Co., a firm of iron masters, the rights to
mine coal from his land for the fixed royalty of 13 shillings and
6 pence per ton.114 Later that year, James Young, an industrial
chemist from Manchester, patented a revolutionary process
that allowed for the first time the profitable distillation of
paraffin oil from coal by low-temperature pyrolysis.115 Finding
that a certain mineral of the Scottish lowlands, known as
Boghead coal, yielded particularly high quantities of paraffin
oil, Young established a large oil production facility in
Bathgate, Scotland, next to Gillespie’s estate, where the
Boghead coal was mined. Realizing in retrospect the
unexpected value of the Boghead coal, Gillespie attempted to
exclude it from the lease on the grounds that it was not truly
coal but shale. 116 After a set of inconclusive negotiations,
Gillespie sued Russell and Co. for mining a mineral not
included in their lease.117
The case constituted a direct attack on Young’s
profitable patent. If the famous Boghead coal was found not to
be a coal, anyone could use it in Young’s new process without
infringing upon Young’s patent. The financial stakes were huge
and both parties assembled unprecedented crowds of mining
experts, geologists, chemists, and microscopists to debate the
true identity of said mineral. Alas, although the chemists
agreed that the great element in coal was carbon, they
disagreed on how to measure it. All experts concurred that
since that coal was of organic origin, the classification of the
mineral in question could be reduced to the microscopic
examination of its organic content. But while one set of
microscopists swore that they saw vegetable tissue in the
substance, the other set was equally sure that there was none.
Lord President of the Court of Session, Duncan McNeil, was
exasperated: “I do not care what you call it. I do not care about
theories of the formation of coal—I do not care about what
113
114

Gillespie v. Russell, 3 S.C. 1 (1854).
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115
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chemists choose to call it.”118 Whatever it was, he reasoned,
Gillespie agreed to lease it. Thus, the verdict was given for the
defendant.119
Gillespie moved for a new trial on the grounds that the
scientific evidence was so contradictory that a new trial was
essential to the justice of the case, and that a new experimental
investigation be ordered to clarify the science involved.120 Recall
the similar request made thirty years earlier, in the 1820
insurance case of Severn, King and Co. v. Imperial Insurance
Co.121 There, the Court of Common Pleas not only ordered a new
trial, but also decided to postpone it until further experimentation would be able to reduce the discrepancies among the
scientific witnesses. By the 1850s, however, the Court of
Session no longer entertained such high hopes. “[T]hey [the
scientists] all agreed upon the theory, but they all disagreed on
what they look at with their own eyes. . . .,” mocked the Lord
President, “My opinion is, that they would differ in the result to
the end of time.”122 Lord Rutherford, a second judge, iterated:
Are we sure that they will be ever agreed? Are we going to get better
microscopes and better eyes? Shall this branch of science, not only
new in its name, but in its scientific terms, become new in a much
more remarkable feature—in the unanimity of its professors? I
cannot expect that. I do not anticipate it.123

The request for a new trial was flatly rejected.124
C.

The Disillusionment with Scientific Expert Testimony

Ironically, the process of disillusionment the legal
system was going through in its relations with science was not
the result of some sort of philosophical relativism or
skepticism. On the contrary, it was the result of hard-dying
positivism that saw in the scientific method the best passage to
truth. One of the most authoritative legal texts of the nineteenth century, written by Chief Justice and legal historian
James Fitzjames Stephen, serves as an example of this deep
118
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irony. According to Sir James, the quest for both legal truths
and truths about the physical world “rest upon the same
foundations . . . . the same great assumptions—the general
uniformity of Nature, and the general trustworthiness of the
senses.” 125 Still, scientific knowledge was much closer to
certainty:
In physical inquiries the relevant facts are usually established by
testimony open to no doubt, because they relate to simple facts
which do not affect the passions, which are observed by trained
observers, who are exposed to detection if they make mistakes, and
who could not tell the effect of misrepresentation if they were
disposed to be fraudulent.126

No wonder, then, that Stephen too interpreted the constant
spectacle of leading scientists contradicting each other from the
witness stand, not as legitimate debates but as a sign of moral
decadence. “As to want of will to speak the truth, the causes of
it are infinitely various,” and in this matter, he concluded, “The
case of experts is as strong a one as can be mentioned. No one
expects an expert, except in the rarest possible cases, to be
quite candid. Most of them—are all but avowedly advocates,
and speak for the side which calls them.”127
The growing scientific controversies in court have
resulted therefore in widespread judicial and public
indignation. In 1862, the conservative Saturday Review
commented:
It is a fact that in all matters which require to be investigated
through the evidence of expert witnesses, the same remarkable
discrepancies show themselves. Hardly a single patent case is ever
tried in which men of the highest scientific eminence do not appear
to contradict one another flatly on the newness of the invention, or of
some of its parts or stages, and the commonest disputes concerning
architects’ and engineering bills are constantly calling forth similar
conflicts of skilled testimony. Even in criminal cases, where the point
to be decided is whether a particular poison was administrated, or
whether a death was caused in a particular way, the evidence of the
experts is generally more contradictory than would be supposed from
the nature of the inquiry; and, in short, judges and lawyers are
rapidly coming to the conclusion that skilled testimony, which ought

125
JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 189 (London, MacMillan & Co., 2d ed. 1890).
126
Id. at 190.
127
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to be the most decisive and convincing of them all, is of all the most
suspicious and unsatisfactory.128

Yet the Review admitted, “To suppose that courts can do
without such evidence would indeed be a stolid and ignorant
prejudice, for expert witnesses can supply materials for
judgments not to be obtained from any other source.”129 Still,
“[t]here is no doubt that a system has been growing up of late
years under which men of special knowledge are consulted
under such circumstances as to render their opinions almost
worthless.”130
The growing public mistrust of science, and even more
so of the integrity of the scientists, in such an important
domain as the legal system, deeply troubled the scientific
community. The evil done by the scandals in court, scientific
leaders emphasized again and again, was great not only to the
administration of justice, but also to the public image of the
Victorian scientific community, which was toiling hard on its
professional status and seeking to expand its influence into the
public domains of education, industry, health, administration,
and culture in general. The reform of expert testimony
therefore became one of the hottest topics in the meetings of
the various scientific and legal societies, and many proposals
were put forward to remedy the situation.131
Almost all scientific commentators agreed that the
disagreements among the scientific witnesses did not reflect
uncertainties within the body of scientific knowledge itself.132
Most of them argued that the disagreements were largely
created by the improper adversarial procedures by which the
legal system processed scientific knowledge. Others were ready
to concede that scientific opinions may legitimately differ. But
even they did not believe that the judge, let alone the lay jury,
could reliably assess these differences. Each pundit had his
own reform proposal, but they all seemed to agree on at least
one of two central elements—that the courts should be allowed
to call their own independent scientific witnesses, and to
128
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appoint, at least in civil cases, scientific assessors who would
sit next to the judge and advise him on technical matters.133
However, even those in the legal profession who
empathized with the frustrated scientific community pointed
out that the reforms proposed by the scientific community ran
against the fundamental postulates of the adversarial legal
system.134 Getting rid of the jury ran against the fundamental
political right to a trial by a jury of one’s peers. And allowing
the court to call in assessors or witnesses independent of the
parties ran against two other equally fundamental postulates—
the right of the parties to control the evidence in court and the
neutrality of the court. The reform suggestions were therefore
rejected by the legal profession, who cautioned that “the
remedy should not be worse than the disease.”135
The legal profession also resisted the scientific attempts
to monopolize expertise by drawing a line between scientific
and non-scientific men. “A man who acquired a particular kind
of knowledge by long training,” insisted Thomas Webster, a
leading authority on Patent Law, who played a central role in
many attempts to reform Patent Law, “was just as much a
scientific man in his particular art as the man who contributed
to those wonderful discoveries of science at which we all so
much rejoice.”136 Thus, it was wrong to speak of scientific men
as a class to the exclusion of such skilled witnesses.
With no resolution in sight, the legal and scientific
fraternities grew belligerent. The legal profession remained
disturbed by the scientific partisanship displayed in the
courtroom, while the scientific community remained frustrated
by the awkward position it occupied in the courtroom. Still, the
deadlock did not stop the increasing deployment of expert
testimony in the courts. The growing scope and accuracy of
scientific knowledge, as well as the constantly enlarging
application of its principles to the business of everyday life, had
inevitably expanded the uses of experts and tended to make the
133
Id. at 120; see, e.g., Committee of Scientific Evidence in Courts of Law,
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134
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courts more and more dependent upon their advice. Still, the
increasing tendency of lawyers to fortify their cases by the
testimony of experts did not reflect appreciation for its
excellence, but rather, the requirements of the rising culture of
Victorian professionalism. The result was an ironic schism that
was clearly emerging during the second half of the nineteenth
century—the same increasingly indispensable expert opinions
that were treated in everyday life as safe and reliable under
the mere good faith of social and business reputation were
considered unsafe and unreliable when given in court under
oath.
IV.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERT
TESTIMONY DURING THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY IN THE UNITED STATES

The sale of expert advice did not become widespread in
America until the middle decades of the nineteenth century.
Once it did, though, the deployment of expert testimony in
American courts of law grew quickly, and with it all its familiar
woes. The American legal system observed the same
adversarial procedures of the common law, while the American
scientific community advertised the same high expectations
from the scientific method, as did its English counterpart.
These two features ensured that in spite of the significant
differences in the institutional and social dynamics of the legal
and scientific communities between the two countries, the
problem of expert testimony would develop in nineteenthcentury America along the same basic pattern displayed in
England. Thus, as in England, the growing deployment of men
of science in divergent areas of litigation turned the American
courts into a lucrative arena for scientific activity.137 And, as in

137
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England, this arena soon put on public display the curious
spectacle of leading scientists disagreeing with each other from
the witness stand, a view that served to cast doubts on the
integrity of the experts and their science.138
A.

The Declining Credibility of Scientific Experts

By 1870, a study on expert testimony was already able
to report in detail on an “unmistakable tendency on the part of
eminent judges and jurists to attach less and less importance
to testimony of this nature,” explaining this result by “the
surprising facility with which scientific gentlemen will swear to
the most opposite opinions upon matters falling within their
domain.”139 Many shared this bleak view. “[W]hoever has read
the reports of trials or been present at them, in which experts
are seen arrayed against each other, prostituting at times the
science which they professed to represent,” wrote U.S. Supreme
Court Chief Justice Morrison Remick Waite in 1874, “need not
be told, that the subject of expert testimony as now understood,
is one of no ordinary importance.”140
Like their English colleagues, American men of science
were much concerned with the damage that the scandals in
court were inflicting on the public image and credibility of their
emerging community, and, like their English colleagues, they
were bitter about the adversarial legal machinery that placed
them in the awkward position of partisan witnesses.141 “[N]o
class connected with the administration of justice is more
frequently misunderstood, or abused,” complained Charles
Himes, a professor of physics and chemistry at Dickinson
University.142 The improper position of science in court seemed
to have turned the scientific witness into a legal annoyance:
Handwriting of Junius: A Review, TIMES (London), May 22, 1871, reprinted in THE
EVIDENCE OF HANDWRITING (Cambridge, Riverside Press 1874).
138
See J. SNOWDEN BELL, THE USE AND ABUSE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 28-34
(Phila., Rees Welsh & Co. 1879); EVAN B. LEWIS, THE LAW OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 5-12
(Phila., Rees Welsh & Co. 1894).
139
Expert Testimony, 5 AM. L. REV. 227, 228 (1871).
140
Morrison R. Waite, Testimony of Experts, 8 W. JURIST 129, 134-35 (1874).
141
See CLEMENS HERSCHEL, ON THE BEST MANNER OF MAKING USE OF THE
SERVICES OF EXPERTS IN THE CONDUCT OF JUDICIAL INQUIRIES 5-7, 11-14 (Boston,
Comm. of the Bar Ass’n of Boston 1886), edited version reprinted in Clemens Herschel,
22 AM. L. REV. 571-77 (1887); Rossiter Johnson, Expert Testimony, 138 N. AM. REV.
602, 602-06 (1884); J. Trowbridge, The Imperiled Dignity of Science and the Law,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1896, at 491.
142
Chas. F. Himes, The Scientific Expert in Forensic Procedure, 85 J.
FRANKLIN INST. 407, 412 (1893).
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[A] sort of intractable, incompatible, inharmonious factor, disturbing
the otherwise smooth current of legal procedure; too important or
necessary to be ruled out, too intelligent and disciplined mentally to
yield without reason to ordinary rules and regulations of the
court . . . and at the same time possessing an undoubted influence
with a jury that it is difficult to restrict by the established rules and
maxims of legal procedures.143

Both the English and the American legal systems were
well aware of the need to protect the credulous jury from
charlatans. Still, neither system was able to lay down a precise
rule for determining who was and who was not a competent
expert. The only legal criterion was 800 years old: those
persons are qualified to speak as experts who possess special
training and experience in the subject in question. Everything
beyond this point remained purely a matter of discretion with
the presiding judge, who had to decide in each case afresh
whether the particular person offered as an expert witness
would be admitted or not. In most cases, it was very hard for
the judge to satisfy himself as to the qualifications of the
persons offered as experts. Scientific titles and diplomas, and
professional reputation, carried little judicial meaning during
the nineteenth century, and preliminary examinations were
impossible to make. The judges therefore were continually
forced to decide on the spur of the moment, and often on the
most difficult subjects, upon the credibility of the persons
offered as experts. Unable to discriminate with any reasonable
degree of accuracy between experts and charlatans, the actual
practice of the courts came to be to admit almost everybody
presented as experts, leaving it for cross-examination to expose
quackery, and for the jury to be the judge of the ensuing battles
between expert witnesses and lawyers.144
No one, of course, trusted the jury to be able to do this
job properly. As one distinguished psychologist of the day
pointed out:
[T]he average jury is unable to pass judgment on, or even to
comprehend in any adequate way, many of the questions submitted
to it—such as motives and capacity of the mind, the power of control,
the analysis of conduct, and the conditions and influences which
have been dominant in certain acts; the application of the law, and
143

Id. at 411-12.
WILLIAM BEST, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE AND
PRACTICES AS TO PROOFS IN COURTS OF COMMON LAW §§ 495-496, at 589-93 (London, S.
Sweet, 2d ed. 1854); Harold L. Korn, Law, Fact, and Science in the Courts, 66 COLUM.
L. REV. 1080, 1084-85 (1966).
144
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the distinctions of responsibility and accountability; the distinctions
of science as to the meaning of certain facts, or the recognition and
discrimination of facts from the mass of statements.145

Here, however, came into play two critical differences between
the English and the American situations. While the English
legal system recognized the jury as the final adjudicator on the
facts of the case, it nevertheless granted its judges the freedom
to take part in the questioning of the witnesses, advise the
counsels in the framing of their questions, and comment fully
on the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the
witnesses in their charge to the jury. The authoritative royal
judges did not hesitate to use these legal instruments to control
the usage of expert testimony in their court and to guide the
jury in its assessment of the scientific witnesses and their
evidence. In addition, from the mid 1860s onward, the English
courts began to divert cases that involved scientific expertise
from jury trials to the juryless Chancery Court. At first it was
mainly patent trials, but in 1875 a parliamentary bill was
passed that officially granted trial judges unfettered discretion
in all civil actions to order a trial without a jury in any matter
requiring scientific evidence that, in their opinion, could not be
handled by the jury.146
The American court lacked access to these two
instruments. The eighteenth-century English notion of the
institution of the jury as a mainstay of liberty was adopted
with added zeal in the American colonies, and the fact that
many judges were laymen with no special claim to legal
competence only added to the prominence of the jury. The
Jacksonian faith in the ability of the common man and the
enduring political philosophy that supported maximizing
citizen participation in government kept this enthusiasm alive
throughout most of the nineteenth century to an extent
unfamiliar in England.147 Consequently, the early nineteenthcentury American juries did pretty much as they pleased. The
145

T.D. Crothers, A Psychological Study of Jurors, 60 ALB. L.J. 341, 342

(1899).
146
R.M. Jackson, The Incidence of Jury Trial During the Past Century, 1 MOD.
L. REV. 132, 139-40 (1937); W.R. CORNISH & G. DE N. CLARK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN
ENGLAND 1750-1950, at 20 (1989).
147
The Seventh Amendment to the American Constitution provides as follows:
“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by a jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by jury, shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of
the common law.” U.S. CONST. amend. VII.

2008]

HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY

919

second half of the century saw a growing pressure by the bar
and the business community to instill more predictability and
rationality in the operation of the jury, but the pressure also
bred popular fears of undue influence. The result was a
practical compromise that was attained by a sharpening of the
law/fact dichotomy and the corresponding spheres of judge and
jury. On the one hand, the power of the jury to determine the
law, especially in civil cases, was eroded. On the other hand,
fears of undue influence on the jury were eased by legislative
and constitutional restrictions on the power of the American
courts in charging juries.148 By 1889, in twenty-one out of the
forty-nine U.S. states and territories, judges were expressly
forbidden by statute or constitutional provision to charge the
jury on questions of fact.149 And in about half of the remaining
twenty-eight states and territories, the courts had voluntarily
adopted the same restriction.150 Only in federal courts and a
minority of state courts were judges allowed to comment on the
weight of the evidence in their charge to the jury.151
American men of science decried the absence of a
judicial hand that would guide the jury in its difficult task of
assessing the scientific evidence of the case. “If it be necessary
to give juries authoritative instruction on points of law, how
can it be less necessary that they should be similarly instructed
in matters involving scientific knowledge?” wondered Scientific
American in 1872:152
Is it any wonder that the public is beginning to mistrust the value of
this kind of [scientific] evidence? Such mistrust is based upon good
grounds enough. As now presented to juries, the testimony of the
both competent and incompetent witnesses, only serves to muddle
their intellects, and to complicate rather than make plain the
facts.153

148
Irwin A. Horowitz & Thomas E. Willging, Changing Views of Jury Power:
The Nullification Debate, 1787-1988, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 165, 168, 170, 180 (1991)
(citing FRIEDMAN, supra note 17; MOLLY SELVIN & LARRY PICUS, THE DEBATE OVER
JURY PERFORMANCE: OBSERVATIONS FROM A RECENT ASBESTOS CASE (1987)); Mark
DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582, 584-89 (1939);
Glenn D. Peters, Invading the Province of the Jury, 2 IND. L.J. 539, 539-45 (1927); Note,
The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170-74, 187-92
(1964); J.B.F., Legislation, Changes in the Jury, 17 VA. L. REV. 497, 499 (1931.
149
Edson R. Sunderland, The Inefficiency of the American Jury, 13 MICH. L.
REV. 302, 307-08 (1915).
150
Id. at 308.
151
Id. at 309.
152
Editorial, Science in the Courts, SCI. AM., Mar. 9, 1872, at 167.
153
Id.
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The nineteenth-century American scientific community
lacked the organization, status, and political resources needed
to challenge the legal system and its procedures. 154 Most
attempts to reform the legal procedures of expert testimony
were initiated by members of the medical and the legal
professions.155 The reform of expert testimony became one of the
hottest topics in the meetings of the various bar associations
that mushroomed in late nineteenth-century America, and
many bills were drafted to remedy the evils of expert
testimony.156 For the selection of experts it was suggested that
they be chosen by the court, either reserving or denying the
right of the parties to call additional witnesses; that the
selection of the courts be unassisted or made from an official
list chosen in some other manner; that the official list be either
permanent or special for each case. 157 In regard to the
examination of witnesses, it was recommended that the examination be by the court, with or without the right of the parties
to cross-examine, or that there be no examination at all and
that the expert would submit a report.158 In regard to decisions
when experts disagree, it was recommended that a jury of
experts be selected or that an expert sit with the judge during
the trial to advise him.159 Alas, the American legislature and
judiciary seemed even more reluctant than their English
counterparts to dissent from the legal axioms of the adversary
system. Most reforms bills did not pass the legislative stage,
and the few that did were promptly held unconstitutional.160

154
See generally S.G. KOHLSTEDT, THE FORMATION OF THE AMERICAN
SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY: THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
SCIENCE, 1848-1860 (1976).
155
One of the first reform bills was a joint effort of the American Academy of
Arts and Sciences, the Suffolk District Medical Society, the Boston Society for Medical
Observation, and the Boston Society for medical Sciences. The bill was written by
Judge Emory Washburn who headed the committee of the Academy of Arts and
Sciences. See Editorial, 90 BOS. MED. & SURGICAL J. 387-88 (Apr. 16, 1874). For a wider
look on the efforts of the medical community, see JAMES C. MOHR, DOCTORS AND THE
LAW: MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 95, 100-05 (1993).
156
For a long list of related commentary, see “Evidence, Expert” in INDEX TO
STATE BAR ASSOCIATION REPORTS AND PROCEEDINGS 176-77 (Dennis A. Dooley ed.,
1942).
157
See, e.g., A.M. Kidd, The Proposed Expert Evidence Bill, 3 CAL. L. REV. 216,
223 (1915).
158
See id. at 224.
159
See William L. Foster, Expert Testimony: Prevalent Complaints and
Proposed Remedies, 11 HARV. L. REV. 169, 180-84 (1897).
160
Gustav A. Endlich, Proposed Changes in the Law of Expert Testimony,
1898 PA. BAR PROCEEDINGS 189-221; Foster, supra note 159, at 182-83; Hand, supra
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The Failure of the Law of Evidence

Unable to check either the selection of the experts or to
guide the jury’s assessment of their evidence, nineteenthcentury American courts concentrated their efforts on the law
of evidence, in an attempt to check the growing problem by
regulating the processes through which the experts
communicated their information in court.
One major legal doctrine sought to protect the credulous
jury from being uncritically influenced by the expert’s view by
preventing the expert from giving his opinion upon the
“ultimate issue,” that is, the precise factual issue before the
jury.161 To permit that, it was held, would put the expert in
place of the jury and invade their province.162 Rational as it
may sound, the application of this doctrine created great
confusion and led to absurd consequences. In theory, it made
irrelevancy a ground for admission, and relevancy for
exclusion. In practice, the “ultimate issue” was often exactly
what the expert testimony was all about. The doctrine seemed,
therefore, to exclude expert evidence exactly where it was most
needed. Consequently, the courts developed various ways to
bypass the rule and allow the witnesses to give their opinion on
the ultimate issue.163
The most popular procedure was to allow an expert to
state in general terms whether a certain cause may have
produced the result under consideration, and leave it to the
jury to decide whether it did produce it or not. To enable this, a
second evidentiary doctrine came into play. Under the
“hypothetical question” doctrine, the expert’s testimony was
given in the form of answers to hypothetically framed
questions.164 These questions specified a set of factual premises,
already submitted in evidence, and the expert was asked to
draw his conclusion from them, assuming that they were true.
This cumbersome technique was justified on triple grounds: to
enable experts to apply their general knowledge to facts that
were not within their personal knowledge; to allow juries to
note 2, at 55, 56-58; Note, Appointment of Expert Witnesses by the Court, 24 HARV. L.
REV. 483, 483-84 (1911).
161
Charles T. McCormick, Expert Testimony as an “Invasion of the Province of
the Jury,” 26 IOWA L. REV. 819, 820 (1941).
162
Id. at 825-39; see also CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 14, at 26 (1954) [hereinafter MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK].
163
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK supra note 161, at 120.
164
McCormick, supra note 161, at 820-25
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hear the factual premises upon which expert opinions were
based; and to allow experts to give their opinions on ultimate
issues without “invading” the province of the jury. Juries were
then instructed to credit the opinions only if they believed the
underlying premises.165
Sound in theory, the technique broke down in practice.
If counsel was required to recite all the relevant facts, the
question became intolerably lengthy; if allowed to select the
facts, as most courts did, it prompted one-sided hypotheses.
Designed and controlled by the interested parties, the
hypothetical question became a means to manipulate the facts
of the case rather than to clarify them for the jury. “It was a
strange irony,” Wigmore noted in 1904, that “the hypothetical
question, which is one of the few truly scientific features of the
rules of Evidence, should have become that feature which does
most to disgust men of science with the law of Evidence.”166
Even the old and powerful hearsay doctrine turned out
to be problematic in the context of expert testimony. The
caution of the courts in admitting opinions not based on
observation of the particular facts of the case, and the fear of
misleading the jurors by reading to them scientific statements
they were hardly competent to assess, had led many courts to
exclude what many considered the most natural source of
scientific information—standard textbooks, reports, etc. The
exclusion of these written documents was justified by the
hearsay doctrine on the premise that they were statements not
made under oath or that their author was not available for
cross-examination. As with other doctrines, the courts slowly
devised ways to work around this one, too. Some courts
permitted the use of scientific treatises, but only to discredit an
expert. Others allowed experts to “refresh their memory” by
reading from standard works. Others even allowed publications
of exact science, assuming their statements to be of ascertained
facts rather than of opinion, and excluded other treatises,
especially medical works.167 Confusion and inconsistency, again,
were rampant.
165

See MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK, supra note 162, § 14, at 31; 2 JOHN H.
WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 672686, at 766-81 (1904); Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 425-27
(1952).
166
McCormick, supra note 12, at 129 (quoting 3 WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE § 686 (3d ed. 1940).
167
See John Henry Wigmore, Scientific Books in Evidence, 26 AM. L. REV. 390,
390-403 (1892); Warren M. Dana, Admission of Learned Treatises in Evidence, WIS. L.
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By the end of the nineteenth century, it was clear that
the American law of evidence had failed to control the problem
of expert testimony. Designed to be the crown of modern
American jurisprudence, a corpus of legal procedures as
rational as Euclidean geometry, the law of evidence had turned
instead into a highly complicated and technical domain,
sagging to the point of collapse under the burden of its own
distinctions, exceptions, and exclusionary duties. 168 In 1898,
James Thayer called it a “piece of illogical, but by no means
irrational, patchwork; not at all to be admired, nor easily to be
found intelligible,” 169 and by 1904, his famous pupil, John
Henry Wigmore, needed four thick volumes to cover it.170 “There
is a full realization now,” concluded the Chicago Legal News in
1909, after a long historical review of expert testimony, “that in
the present practice we have carried a branch of procedure out
to the utter defeat of its object, to an absurdity; and that the
result has been a wide-spread disgust with methods of legal
administration.”171
Thus, although first raising its head in the English
courts, it was in America that the problem of expert testimony
reached its fullest expression. The diversion in England of
technical litigation away from jury trials and the efforts of the
authoritative royal judges seemed to have kept the thriving
business of expert testimony under relative check. The last
decades of the nineteenth century saw the bitter English
debates concerning the problems of expert testimony subsiding.
Across the Atlantic, however, things went from bad to worse.
Unable to check either the selection of the experts or their
evidence in court, or the jury’s assessment of this evidence, late
nineteenth-century American courts saw the problem of
scientific expert testimony reach a crisis.172
REV. 455, 455-62 (1945); JOHN D. LAWSON, THE LAW OF EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE
REDUCED TO RULES 169-94 (St. Louis, F.H. Thomas 1883); HENRY WADE ROGERS, THE
LAW OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 166-86 (St. Louis, William H. Stevenson 1883).
168
James B. Thayer, The Present and Future of the Law of Evidence, 12 HARV.
L. REV. 71, 72-74 (1898).
169
Id. at 72.
170
See WIGMORE, supra note 165. Thayer’s son later reminisced how a famous
judge, J.H. Choate, asked him to tell his father that his famous Preliminary Treatise on
Evidence at the Common Law (1898) was a good book, “but it is a pity he did not
publish it while there was still such a thing in existence as the law of evidence.” Ezra
Ripley Thayer, Observations on the Law of Evidence, 13 MICH. L. REV. 355, 364 (1915).
171
Bond, Expert Witness, 42 CHI. LEGAL NEWS 115 (1909).
172
Much research is still needed on the developments in England. Clearly,
despite the relatively greater judicial control and latitude, the problem of scientific
expert testimony has continued to simmer in English courts throughout the twentieth
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The grim legal mood was captured by Judge Gustav
Endlich in his 1896 address on expert testimony before the
prestigious Law Academy of Philadelphia:
Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of language within the bounds of
decent and temperate criticism, which ought to be regarded as
excessively severe in commenting upon the expert testimony
nuisance as it has, of late years, been infesting our courts. In the
way of wasting the public time, in the way of burdening litigants
with expense, and in the way of beclouding the real issues to be tried
and effecting miscarriages of justice, it has grown to the proportions
of an offensive scandal. Instead of being an aid in the administration
of the law, it has become a positive hindrance to it. Instead of
assisting in the approximation of the truth, it has become the means
of obscuring it. . . . [E]xpert testimony is to-day discredited and
rightly discredited by the courts, and ridiculed and rightly ridiculed
by the hard common sense of the people.173

This outlook was shared by many, in and out of the legal
profession. Invited to speak on expert testimony before the
New Hampshire Medical Society at its 1897 annual meeting,
Judge William Foster chose to open his address with a joke
popular within legal circles: “There are three kinds of liars,—
the common liar, the [damned] liar, and the scientific expert.”174
Foster assures his scientific audience:
This characterization . . . is bestowed . . . not only by defeated
lawyers and their enraged clients, but also by eminent members of
the legal profession, both lawyers and judges, as well as by worthy
and respectable members of the general public outside of the
professions involved. It is the voice of the people and of the press, as
well as that of the bench and the bar. It is the fashion.175

V.

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE TWENTIETH CENTURY IN
THE UNITED STATES

As Endlich’s and Foster’s choice of words made clear,
the feeling by the end of the nineteenth century was that the
problem of expert testimony had reached rock bottom.176 The

century. See generally SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE EYE OF THE LAW (A.M. Muir
Wood ed., 2000); HARRY WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT (1996); E.
Erzinclioglu, British Forensic Science in the Dock, NATURE 859-60 (1998).
173
GUSTAV ENDLICH, EXPERT TESTIMONY: WHAT IS TO BE DONE WITH IT? 5,
12-13 (Phila. 1896).
174
See Foster, supra note 159, at 169.
175
Id.
176
Judicial complaints about scientific expert testimony could be compiled
almost at will. For one of the more extensive compilations, see L.G. Kinne, Expert
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debate over its causes and solution had been picking up steam
for almost half a century, and the remedies suggested, as
another judge put it, were “as numerous as prescriptions for
the cure of rheumatism and generally about as useful.”177 The
disease was spreading fast, however, and the pressure for a
remedy, any kind of a remedy, was mounting. Something
eventually had to give way in the sacred triangulation of the
adversarial system: either the political postulate of the lay
jury, the traditional right of the parties to furnish all evidence,
or the neutral position of the court.
In 1905, Michigan made the first attempt to accomplish
such a reform by an act of the legislature. It passed a statute
that embodied the most popular reform suggestion—that of
allowing the court to nominate its own experts. The statute
contained the mildest possible version of such a reform. It did
not preclude the parties from using their own witnesses but
provided in criminal cases for the additional appointment by
the court of no more than three disinterested persons, whose
identity should not be made public, to investigate issues
involving expert knowledge and testify to their findings at the
trial. Nevertheless, the Michigan Supreme Court held the
statute unconstitutional.178 The court considered it no part of
the duties of the court to select witnesses.179 Such activity, it
pointed out, transferred the power of choosing witnesses from
the prosecutor, an administrative officer, to a member of the
judicial department, in violation of the provision of the state
constitution for a separation of powers.180 The court considered
the statute a violation also of the fundamental right of the
accused to a fair and impartial trial. The official sanction of
judicial appointment, the court pointed out, would give the
court experts an “extraordinary certificate of candor, ability,
and truthfulness, while the other testimony in the case must be
judged by the jury by ordinary standards.” 181 Declaring the
legislation in question unconstitutional, the court expressed
the opinion that the only available remedy for the
acknowledged evils at which the statute aimed would have to
Testimony—Its Origin, Value, Dangers and Proper Place in Jurisprudence, 4 AM. LAW.
201, 201-04 (1896); see also Learned Hand’s famous piece on the topic, supra note 2.
177
Kidd, supra note 159, at 217.
178
People v. Dickerson 129 N.W. 199, 199-201 (Mich. 1910).
179
Id. at 200-01.
180
Id. at 201.
181
Id.
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be found in a “livelier sense of responsibility to the public for
the proper and decent administration of justice.”182
The decision dealt a serious blow to those who had been
advocating reform of expert testimony by means of statutory
enactment. Taking their cue from the Michigan Supreme
Court, and accepting that the experts should remain partychosen and the jury still be considered the final trier of facts,
early twentieth-century American legal scholars concentrated
their attention on improving the standards of admissibility for
the party-chosen expert.183 Their renewed hopes of succeeding
where their predecessors had so miserably failed hinged on a
clear change in the market of scientific expertise, created by
the rising professional culture in America. By the second
decade of the twentieth century, the individual expert who
developed and marketed his or her own expertise had already
been replaced by a community of experts who shared, and were
defined by, common standards of competence and ethics. A
wide range of expertise, from the scientific and technological
fields of the chemists, physicists, and engineers, to architects,
surveyors, actuaries, realtors, insurers, and accountants, came
to be dominated by professional associations of practitioners.
These associations developed codes of ethics, standards of
education, training and practice, and defined minimum
qualifications of certification either through their own
examinations or through those of the various state boards of
examiners.184
By the second decade of the twentieth century, one can
find legal scholars pondering the ways in which the courts
could take advantage of this standardized market of expertise
to check the problem of expert testimony. “The remedy is not in
the enactment of any new statute,” wrote one scholar in 1910.185
“No act of the legislature will make witnesses learned or
honest. The reform must come from the professions
themselves.” 186 It was not clear exactly how such a reform
should be carried out. “There is . . . the logical possibility that
no remedy exists, or that any proposed remedy brings in its
182

Id.; see also Note, supra note 160, at 483-84.
E.g., Lee M. Friedman, Expert Testimony: Its Abuse and Reformation, 19
YALE L.J. 247, 252-57 (1910).
184
THOMAS L. HASKELL, THE AUTHORITY OF EXPERTS: STUDIES IN HISTORY
AND THEORY 180-225 (1984).
185
Friedman, supra note 183, at 252.
186
Id.
183
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train new evils worse that the disease which it cures,” claimed
another commentator in 1915.187 One thing was clear, though.
“In the selection of experts no solution can be considered
satisfactory that does not provide for the selection by the
profession involved.”188 Eight years later, in 1923, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia came up with the first
effective formulation of such a solution.189
A.

The General Acceptance Standard

The decision was occasioned by the newly invented and
highly publicized lie-detector technology. In 1922, a young
African-American named James Frye was accused of murder in
Washington, D.C.190 Frye pleaded not guilty, and his lawyer
offered one of the inventors of the lie detector, William
Marston, as an expert witness to testify to the results of a test
performed on the defendant, which allegedly proved his
truthfulness. 191 The trial judge, Walter Irvin McCoy of the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, refused to admit
Marston and his sensational test in evidence.192 As far as he
was concerned, McCoy proclaimed, such tests were
inadmissible until “there is an infallible instrument for
ascertaining whether a person is speaking the truth or not. . . .,
[but] I shall be dead by that time, probably, and it will bother
some other judge, not me.”193 Frye was found guilty, and his
lawyer appealed on the ground that the scientific expert and
his evidence were improperly excluded.194
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
likewise was not going to allow the sensational lie-detector test
into the court. Still, being an appellate court, it needed to
furnish a better rationale for its exclusion than McCoy’s
peculiar infallibility standard. This was not an easy task,
however. In 1923, there was no special rule for the
admissibility of scientific evidence. Like every other type of
evidence, scientific evidence was mainly evaluated according to
187

Kidd, supra note 159, at 218, 223.
Friedman, supra note 183, at 252; Kidd, supra note 159, at 218, 223.
189
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
190
See WILLIAM MOULTON MARSTON, LIE DETECTOR TEST 70-72 (1938).
191
See id. at 71-72.
192
See James E. Starrs, A Still-Life Watercolor: Frye v. United States, 27 J.
FORENSIC SCI. 684, 691 (1982).
193
Id. at 694.
194
Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
188
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the traditional evidentiary criteria: the “logical relevancy” of
the evidence and its helpfulness to the trier of fact, and the
qualifications of the witness. 195 Neither criterion offered the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia much reason to
exclude the lie detector. The logical relevance of the test and its
potential helpfulness to the jury were obvious. So were the
credentials of the test inventor, William Marston. He was a
lawyer, a member of the Massachusetts Bar, and a wellpublished research psychologist, who possessed special training
and extensive practical experience in the subject in question.196
Thus qualified, the weight of legal precedent of expert
testimony was clearly for admissibility.197
Unable to exclude Dr. Marston and his deception test on
the basis of the existing admissibility rules, the Frye court put
forward an innovative rationale that shifted the focus of the
admissibility process from the expert’s credentials to the
particular scientific knowledge he proposed to the court.
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle
must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle
or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs. We think that the systolic blood
pressure deception test has not yet gained such standing scientific
recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as
would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from
the discovery, development, and experiments thus far made. The
judgment is affirmed. 198

Proposing to look for a general acceptance in the particular
field to which the expertise belonged, Frye offered a potent
point of departure from the traditional deadlock of scientific
expert testimony. The jury was still considered the final trier of
facts, and the experts would still be party-chosen; but the
195
See MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK, supra note 162, at 489; JAMES BRADLEY
THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 266 (Boston,
Little, Brown, and Co. 1898); Herman L. Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevance—A
Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L. REV. 385, 385, 392 (1952).
196
KEN ALDER, THE LIE DETECTORS: THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN
OBSESSION 39-40, 48-51 (2007).
197
See BEST, supra note 144, at §§ 513-515, at 867-88; THAYER, supra note
195, at 195-97; David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse
Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present and Worrying About the
Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1803-04 (1994).
198
Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
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judicial ability to control the market of scientific expert
testimony was significantly extended from the realm of the
expert to the realm of expertise.199
A century and a half earlier, in 1782, George Hardinge,
barrister of the Middle Temple, suggested a similar rationale
in Folkes v. Chadd. 200 John Smeaton was a worthy expert,
Hardinge argued, but he propounded in court a theory whose
scientific status was yet unsettled. Hence, his evidence should
be excluded. Lord Mansfield rejected the proposed distinction
between the expert and his expertise. Mansfield’s decision,
maintaining that it was not for the court to qualify the expert’s
opinion, shaped the nineteenth-century practice of expert
testimony.201 If a person was qualified as an expert, his or her
expert opinion came along; it was the job of the cross-examiner
to expose the weaknesses of the testimony and for the jury to
weigh it.202 A century and a half later, the Frye court reintroduced Hardinge’s exclusionary logic into the rules of evidence;
being an expert was no longer enough.203
The Frye opinion portrayed scientific knowledge as an
evolutionary process that had to advance from the experimental to a demonstrable stage before it could be accepted in
the court. This resonated admirably with the pragmatic vision
of American professional culture that conceived of expert
knowledge as a communal product that could be objectively
evaluated, independently from the individual expert. 204 In a
similar fashion, the search for general acceptance within the
relevant scientific community accorded well with the dominant
progressive views of the age, which conceived of law as an
organic part of greater society and emphasized the role of
coordinated expertise in the joint attempt to run society

199

Wigmore offered a similar but less demanding formulation in a new
section, entitled “Scientific Experimental Tests by Psychologists,” that he added to the
1923 edition of his famous treatise on evidence: “All that should be required as a
condition is the preliminary testimony of a scientist that the proposed test is an
accepted one in his profession and that it has a reasonable measure of precision in its
indications.” 2 WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 990, at 419.
200
See supra text accompanying notes 63-67.
201
See THAYER, supra note 31, at 672-73; 4 WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 1917, at
102-04.
202
See MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK, supra note 162, at 363-64.
203
See Frye, 293 F. at 1014; Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of
Daubert: A New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 725-27 (1994).
204
Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Thirteen Pragmatisms, 5 J. PHIL. PSYCH. & SCI.
METHODS 1-12, 29-39 (1908); H.S. THAYER, MEANING AND ACTION: A CRITICAL HISTORY
OF PRAGMATISM 50-66 (1968).
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efficiently and uniformly.205 Still, originating in an extreme case
and containing no precedential citations, the decision of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia remained at first
an isolated solution to a particular problem. During the
following three decades, the courts remained content with
applying the requirement for general acceptance only to
exorcize from criminal trials evidence derived from various liedetection and truth serum schemes.206 It was only in the postWorld War II years that the courts began to apply the general
acceptance requirement as an exclusive test in a constantly
broadening range of novel scientific evidence.207
The growing adoption of Frye signaled the onset of a
new judicial trend towards ever-greater judicial scrutiny of
scientific evidence. The expansion of this judicial role during
the second part of the twentieth century can be described in
terms of both the scope of the cases to which it has been
applied and the depth of the judicial scrutiny of the scientific
evidence. Thus, by the early 1950s, Frye was already addressed
in the legal literature as the leading criterion for the admissibility of novel types of scientific evidence in criminal trials.208
In the 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court restricted the acquisition
of evidence in criminal cases via traditional interrogation
techniques.209 Perhaps in response, crime laboratories flooded
the courts with innovative scientific technologies, and trial
judges started to use Frye as a ready-made tool to decide the
reliability of evidence derived from new techniques such as
voice prints, neutron activation analysis, gunshot residue tests,
bite mark comparisons, scanning electron microscopic analysis,
205

See generally Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological
Jurisprudence (pts. 1-3), 24 HARV. L. REV. 591 (1911), 25 HARV. L. REV. 140, 489 (19111912).
206
See FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE STATE
OF NEW YORK 264-65 (1948); Charlotte L. Smallwood, Comment, Evidence: LieDetector: Discussion and Proposals, 29 CORNELL L. Q. 535, 535-38 (1944). Courts cited
Frye only five times prior to World War II; each case but one involved lie detectors. See
SHEPARD'S FEDERAL CITATIONS.
207
After World War II, the case was only cited 6 times before 1950, 20 times
during the 1950s, 21 times during the 1960s, 100 times during the 1970s, 470 times
during the 1980s, and 350 times in the early 1990s. See Black et al., supra note 203, at
722 n.30.
208
See, e.g., MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK, supra note 162, at 363; Felver A.
Rowell, Jr., Comment, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by Scientific Devices and
Analysis, 6 ARK. L. REV. 181, 181 (1952).
209
See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Stovall v. Deno, 388 U.S. 293
(1967).
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truth sera, and numerous others. 210 By the 1970s, Frye’s
general acceptance standard had become “not only the majority
view . . . [but] the almost universal view” in the majority of
criminal courts that considered the admissibility of new
scientific evidence.211 By the end of the 1980s, the judiciary
expanded its use from criminal to civil proceedings.212 Finally,
by the 1990s, as the judiciary grew confident in their ability to
measure the proffered expert evidence, the courts moved from
deferring to the judgment of the scientific community to
independently finding out things for themselves.213
The expanding judicial dominion over scientific expert
testimony met with increased criticism.214 The earliest critics
considered judicial screening of the scientific evidence as an
unnecessary procedure that deprived the jurors of their right to
decide for themselves what facts are valuable.215 As the use of
Frye multiplied, so did its critics—complaining that the general
acceptance criterion was too vague, too narrow, and too slow.216
The courts responded by setting forth supporting rationales.
Their main argument was that Frye finally provided the courts
with a uniform “method for ensuring the reliability of the
210
Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v.
United States, A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1198-1200; Edward J.
Imwinkelried, A New Era in the Revolution of Scientific Evidence—A Primer on
Evaluating the Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 261, 261-63
(1982).
211
Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence:
A Critique from the Perspective of Juror Psychology, 28 VILL. L. REV. 554, 556 (1983).
By the mid-1970s approximately forty-five states followed the Frye standard. Id. at
557.
212
Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1208 (6th Cir. 1988). The
Sixth Circuit did not cite Frye; nevertheless it excluded “clinical ecology” evidence for
not being generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. The Fifth Circuit
applied Frye soon after, in 1991, in Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d
1106, 1115-16 (5th Cir. 1991). Tellingly, both of these were toxic tort cases.
213
See the so-called Daubert trilogy: Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579 (1993); General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co.,
Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
214
David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye, Again: The Past, Present, and Future of the
General Acceptance Test, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 385, 396-400 (2001); Giannelli, supra note
210, at 1197 n.59; Imwinkelried, supra note 210, at 264-67; John D. Borders, Jr., Note,
Fit to Be Fryed: Frye v. United States and the Admissibility of Novel Scientific
Evidence, 77 KY. L.J. 849, 860-62 (1989).
215
Professor McCormick criticized the general acceptance test and argued
that it “is a proper condition upon the court’s taking judicial notice of scientific facts,
but not a criterion for the admissibility of scientific evidence.” MCCORMICK,
HANDBOOK, supra note 162, at 363.
216
Giannelli, supra note 209, at 1226 n.59; Imwinkelried, supra note 210, at
265; Frederic I. Lederer, Resolving the Frye Dilemma—A Reliability Approach, 26
JURIMETRICS J. 240, 241 (1986).
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scientific evidence.” 217 However, in practice, “the thing from
which the deduction is made” has meant different things to
different courts at different times. The ambiguities inherent in
determining the particular field to which new scientific
evidence belongs, and in deciding how to measure its “general
acceptance,” left ample room for discretion. Consequently, Frye
ended up having not one but many general acceptance criteria,
which the courts seemed to apply in a selective manner,
according to their own views about the reliability of the
particular forensic technique before them.218
Meanwhile, a new twist entered the plot. In 1975, the
rules that federal judges must follow were finally codified.
Completely disregarding Frye, the newly enacted Federal Rules
of Evidence (“FRE”) prescribed no special test to ensure the
reliability of scientific evidence, new or old. Instead, casting the
widest net possible, the FRE provided:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
opinion or otherwise.219

Having left open the question of how one defines “scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge,” the FRE was
generally interpreted as prescribing a more flexible judicial
consideration of scientific evidence in order to create the
opportunity for more types of scientific evidence to be used in
court.220 On the other hand, since the FRE did not state an
explicit intent to abandon the Frye rule, some federal and
almost all state courts remained committed to the “general

217

Giannelli, supra note 209, at 1207.
Id. at 1210-11, 1221; see also MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK, supra note 162, at
363-64; Black et al., supra note 203, at 724; Ronald N. Boyce, Judicial Recognition of
Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases, 8 UTAH L. REV. 313, 314-15 (1964); John
William Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970 U.
ILL. L.J. 1, 14; DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
820-26 (1977).
219
FED. R. EVID. 702 (1975).
220
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the general approach of the Federal
Rules of Evidence was “of relaxing the traditional barriers to opinion testimony.” The
Court referred to Frye’s as an “austere standard, absent from and incompatible with,
the Federal Rules of Evidence.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. According to Judge
Weinstein, “The Rules were designed to depend primarily upon lawyer-adversaries and
sensible triers of fact to evaluate conflicts.” Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence Is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 631 (1991)
(quoted in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589).
218
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acceptance” criterion as an absolute prerequisite to the
admissibility of scientific evidence.221
The debate concerning the proper judicial attitude and
standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence intensified
during the late 1980s and early 1990s, heated by growing fears
of a mass tort litigation explosion.222 Until the 1970s, judicial
scrutiny of scientific evidence took place almost exclusively in
criminal cases, where life and liberty are on the line. 223
However, the 1970s saw the rise of tort law as a new major
arena for scientific evidence. Dangerous drugs, industrial
defects, environmental pollutants, and a host of other
technological breakdowns have all become the subject of
prolonged civil litigation with ever-escalating financial
stakes.224 In the great majority of these cases, the central legal
questions were of risk and causation, which invariably turned
upon scientific evidence and put on display, again, the all-toofamiliar sight of leading scientific experts producing from the
witness stand conflicting data and contradictory conclusions.225
The customary complaints soon followed, and the
warning was sounded that America’s courts were being
swamped by “junk science,” produced by an unholy alliance
between unscrupulous experts and opportunistic attorneys.226
The judges were urged to raise the bar and rely on the
conservative interpretation of Frye in order to protect the
credulous jury from pseudoscientific experts, and the deeppocketed corporations from greedy lawyers.227 Others objected.
The Frye test, they argued, sanctions a stifling and repressive
scientific orthodoxy that could prevent the courts from learning
221

Giannelli, supra note 209, at 1228-31.
See generally PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM (1991).
223
Bernstein, supra note 214, at 389-90.
224
See generally MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL
EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE (1996); JOSEPH SANDERS,
BENDECTIN ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF MASS TORT LITIGATION (1998); PETER H. SCHUCK,
AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS (1987). But see
Michael Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation
System, and Why Not?, 140 U. PENN. L. REV. 1147, 1149 (1992) (examining tort
litigation data from the mid-1970s to 1991).
225
For a plethora of examples, see HUBER, supra note 222; PHANTOM RISK:
SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE AND THE LAW (Kenneth R. Foster et al., eds. 1993).
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supra
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17-20;
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON
COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN AMERICA 4 (1991); CARNEGIE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND GOVERNMENT, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
IN JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 11 (1993).
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HUBER, supra note 222, at 200-01.
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of authentic scientific innovations and citizens from seeking
justice. 228 Hence, they urged the court to adopt the relaxed
admissibility requirements of the FRE. 229 In short, the twocenturies-old debate between the Goulds, who maintain that
the law should exclude from the courtroom certain expert
opinions for not being scientific enough, and the Mansfields,
who maintain that the law has no means to give preference to
one kind of science over another, was back with renewed vigor.
B.

Daubert in Historical Perspective

The conflict came to a head in 1993, when a civil suit by
two minors, Jason Daubert and Eric Schuller, and their
parents, against the giant pharmaceutical corporation Merrell
Dow was decided by the Supreme Court. Daubert and Schuller
were born with serious birth defects and blamed them on
Merrell Dow’s Bendectin, a popular anti-nausea drug their
mothers took during their pregnancies.230 To prove a causal link
between the drug and the birth defects, Daubert’s lawyers
offered eight well-credentialed experts, who based their
conclusion that Bendectin can cause birth defects on: animal
studies that found links between Bendectin and malformation;
chemical analysis which pointed to structural similarities
between Bendectin and other substances known to cause birth
defects; and re-analysis of previously published epidemiological
data that found a link between the drug and birth defects.231
The federal judge was not impressed, finding that the animal
studies and the chemical analysis insufficient to show
causation.232 The meta-analysis of the epidemiological data, he
further pointed out, was created especially for the trial and
was neither published nor subjected to peer-review.233 Thus, it
could not be considered to be generally accepted under Frye.

228
See, e.g., Michael S. Jacobs, Testing the Assumptions Underlying the
Debate About Scientific Evidence: A Closer Look at Juror “Incompetence” and Scientific
“Objectivity,” 25 CONN. L. REV. 1083, 1085 (1993); Sheila Jasanoff, What Judges Should
Know About the Sociology of Science, 77 JUDICATURE 77, 82 (1993).
229
See, e.g., Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach
to Admissibility, 67 IOWA L. REV. 879, 908-15.
230
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 571 (1989), aff’d,
951 F.2d 1128, 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
231
Id. at 573.
232
Id. at 575.
233
Id.
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Consequently, the judge granted summary judgment to Merrell
Dow and threw the case out before it could reach a jury.234
Daubert’s lawyers appealed all the way to the Supreme
Court, arguing that the FRE supersedes Frye and that
according to the FRE, it is for a jury, not a judge, to determine
the persuasiveness of scientific evidence. The Court agreed
with the petitioners that Frye was superseded by the FRE, but
rejected their let-it-all-in interpretation of the FRE. Instead,
the Supreme Court read the FRE as requiring that the trial
judge ensure that any scientific evidence admitted into the
courtroom be reliable. Addressing the main question left open
by the FRE—how one recognizes valid scientific knowledge—
the Supreme Court acknowledged that ready-made formulae,
such as the “general acceptance” criterion, failed to provide the
desired answer.235 Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that an
answer must be provided, and if a general formula could not be
furnished, then it was the responsibility of trial judges to make
their own inquiries in each and every case in order to provide
it.236 To that end, the Supreme Court took a courageous dip into
the murky waters of modern philosophy of science and came up
with a flexible recipe of four non-exclusive factors that could be
used by the trial judge in determining the quality of the
scientific evidence proposed: testability, peer review,
standardization, and general acceptance.237
Emphasizing the need for independent judicial inquiry
into the reliability of all scientific evidence, Daubert has been
widely celebrated as a breakthrough in the attitude of the
courts towards scientific evidence. The decision was labeled the
“death of Frye.”238 The seventy years since Frye were declared to
have been “seven decades of hiding from science,” 239 and
Daubert’s new set of criteria was hailed as an attempt “to deal
substantively with the problem of expert testimony in the
234

Id. at 576.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
236
Id. at 594-97.
237
Id. at 592-94. The petitioners won the Supreme Court battle but lost the
war. The Ninth Circuit reconsidered the evidence and affirmed its exclusion again, this
time under the new Daubert criteria. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d
1311, 1322 (9th Cir. 1995). For a detailed analysis of the Daubert decision and its
criteria, see KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 4-16 (1997).
238
Note the title of the symposium published in Scientific Evidence After the
Death of Frye: Daubert and Its Implications for Toxic Tort, Pharmaceutical, and
product Liability Cases, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1959 (1994).
239
Black et al., supra note 203, at 722.
235
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courts.”240 However, a perspective beyond seven decades allows
us to see Daubert more as the offspring of Frye rather than its
killer. True, Daubert displaced Frye, but it also inherited Frye’s
exclusionary logic. No longer a passive umpire who watches
over the rules of the game, the twentieth-century trial judge
has become an active player, a gatekeeper charged with the
responsibility for screening unreliable scientific evidence. First
formulated by the Frye court, albeit in a milder form, this
exclusionary spirit has since come to dominate American legal
thought, and the Daubert decision only served to affirm it more
vigorously. Its admissibility criteria may be different, but its
mindset followed, and put the final stamp on, the twentiethcentury trend toward ever-greater judicial scrutiny of scientific
evidence.
VI.

DISCUSSION

What can we learn from this concise history of scientific
expert testimony? First and foremost, that scientific expert
testimony in common law courts has a long and rich history.
This simple lesson is particularly important in the context of
the current tendency to present the malaise of science in the
courts as a sign of our time, the result of the growing volume
and complexity of late twentieth-century science. 241 As this
Article makes clear, this widely held assumption is flat wrong.
Far from being new, the putative problems of scientific expert
testimony in common law courts have existed since science was
first introduced into the adversarial courtroom. The difficulties
of fitting science within adversarial procedures; the reluctance
of courts to mold a procedure that would shield science from
the adversarial fire; the chronic inability of courts to bridge the
gap between scientific experts and lay jurors; the failure of the
legal and scientific professions to regulate the market of
expertise; the resultant fear of a credulous jury bewitched in
the name of science by charlatans and opportunists—none of
these predicaments was new to the twentieth century. 242
Not only the problems but also the debate over their
meaning and the ways to resolve them had by the latenineteenth century all of the features that today are blithely
240

ANGELL, supra note 224, at 127.
See Development in the Law, Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific
Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1481, 1484-85 (1995).
242
See supra Parts I-IV.
241
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assumed to be new.243 Almost every twentieth-century reform
proposal can be traced back to the nineteenth century,
including self-regulation, 244 court-appointed experts, 245 preapproved experts lists, 246 scientific tribunals, 247 and expert
juries.248 All these reform proposals fell flat. Not surprisingly,
then, the feeling by the late twentieth century was remarkably
similar to that which prevailed a century earlier: the problem
of expert testimony had reached rock bottom.249
Legal scholarship has not been entirely oblivious of the
problematic history of science in the courts. 250 Still, the
relevance and significance of this history have been
undermined by at least two arguments. The first holds that
experts who served as witnesses in the courts in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, and even in the early twentieth
century, were not really scientists but experience-based
experts.251 This argument is, again, wrong. Prominent scientific
experts made regular appearances in courts of law throughout
the nineteenth century, 252 if not earlier. 253 Furthermore, one
could argue that in these earlier centuries law and science
actually enjoyed closer, if not better, relations. Indeed, in the
nineteenth century, which offered scientists very limited career
opportunities, the legal system stood out as an exceptional and
most lucrative market for scientific expertise—so much so that,
while writing about the spectrum of Victorian science
patronage, one historian of science could not help but wonder
why it was that “on more than one occasion it would seem . . .
243
See supra Part III.C. For more on the nineteenth-century reform proposals,
see GOLAN, supra note 38, at 107-43.
244
Edward K. Cheng, Same Old, Same Old: Scientific Evidence Past and
Present, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1387, 1399-400 (2006).
245
Id. at 1393-96; see also Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Court-Appointed
Experts, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 525, 529-73 (1st ed. 1994).
246
Cheng, supra note 244, at 1395-96.
247
Id. at 1396-99; see generally Arthur Kantrowitz, Proposal for an Institution
for Scientific Judgment, 153 SCIENCE 763 (1967); James A. Martin, The Proposed
“Science Court,” 75 MICH. L. REV. 1058 (1977).
248
Cheng, supra note 244, at 1396-98.
249
See, e.g., HUBER, supra note 222, at 3-5.
250
See, e.g., Hand, supra note 2. For examples of historians’ accounts focusing
on medical expert testimony, see MOHR, supra note 155; Landsman, supra note 33
(both articles); see also Hamlin, supra note 131.
251
See, e.g., Lee Loevinger, Science as Evidence, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 153, 154
(1995) (“[M]any experts who served as witnesses in the courts in earlier centuries, and
even in the twentieth century prior to Frye, were not scientists.”).
252
See supra Parts III, IV.
253
See supra Part II.
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that all the chemists in London were being shared by aggrieved
parties in a patent action.”254 In the 1850s, for example, August
Hofmann, a major figure in the field of organic chemistry and a
leading consultant to the artificial dye industry, was able to
pull in a yearly income of eight to nine thousand pounds from
his court appearances.255 Hofmann made this lofty income in
patent litigation, which became a most profitable sideline
activity for many leading men of science on both sides of the
Atlantic.256
It would be a mistake, however, to subsume the evolving
relations between law and science under monetary interests
alone. Early nineteenth-century scientists dreamt of becoming
“true amicus curia . . . a terror to the guilty and a joy to the
innocent.” 257 But what had seemed in the early part of the
nineteenth century as a central civil function of science had
become by the end of the century a source of discontent. The
courts were growing increasingly weary and wary of the
conflicting scientific testimony, and the scientific community
was growing increasingly bitter with the courts’ deployment of
its services. Far from being irrelevant, then, the history of
nineteenth-century scientific expert testimony tells a dramatic
story: what had started as a great promise of cooperation
between law and science ended with mutual disenchantment.
Instead of bringing these two powerful fraternities closer,
forensic science pulled them further apart.258
A second assumption that served to discount the
historical depth of the problems of science in the courts is that
the growing volume and complexity of science made it
increasingly harder for the judicial system to manage late

254

William H. Brock, The Spectrum of Science Patronage, in THE PATRONAGE
173, 187 (G.L’E. Turner ed., 1976).
255
Id. at 5.
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See GOLAN, supra note 38, at 81-96. For scientific experts appearing in
American courts, see RALPH K. ANDRIST, STEAMBOATS ON THE MISSISSIPPI (1962)
(steamboat explosions); DE VILLE, supra note 137 (malpractice cases); LAWSON, supra
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and Controversy: Patenting Science in the Nineteenth Century, 29 BRIT. J. HIST. SCI.
139 (1996) (same); Okun, supra note 137 (food and drug adulteration); Fred Quivik,
Smoke and Tailings: An Environmental History of Copper Smelting Technologies in
Montana, 1880-1930 (1998) (Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Pa.) (pollution cases); Spence,
supra note 137 (mining cases).
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Relations, PROC. AM. SOC’Y MICROSCOPISTS, Sept. 1889, at 5.
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twentieth-century science-rich cases. 259 However, this widely
held assumption has never been corroborated by comparative
historical studies.260 Moreover, it is not clear why we should
even assume that present-day judges and jurors would find it
harder to handle the scientific evidence presented before them
in court. Is DNA profiling really more complicated than
fingerprinting or nineteenth-century blood tests? Is the science
involved in testing new pharmaceuticals drugs harder to
comprehend than the nineteenth-century science involved in
patenting artificial dyes? Many historians and philosophers of
science would answer in the negative. Science, they teach,
advances not by sheer accumulation of details and
complexities, but by devising new theories with superior
organizational and predictive powers, which are not necessarily
more complex. 261
Even if we concede that modern science did grow more
complex (certainly it grew richer and far more specialized), we
can still point to other developments that actually made science
more accessible to laypersons. Scientific language, literature,
and training have all been systematized, and its credentials,
equipment, and procedures standardized. The presentation of
scientific evidence in court has also been improved by visual
technologies such as medical imaging and computer animation
and simulation. Finally, lay understanding of science has
greatly improved during the twentieth century, following the
vast increase in the availability of modern education. All this
supports the notion that a present-day factfinder should find it
easier, not harder, to handle the scientific evidence presented
in court. Indeed, during the last two decades, courts have
consistently pronounced their confidence in the ability of lay
judges to do just that—to critically evaluate the scientific

259

See, e.g., CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND GOVERNnote 226, at 1.
260
My own historical studies do not support this assumption. See GOLAN,
supra note 38, at 211-64.
261
No philosopher has explicitly discussed this aspect of complexity in any
detail. However, many philosophers have described scientific progress as responding to
notions such as simplicity, organizational strength, and predictive power. This implies
that complexity may actually decrease at any given developmental step, or at least that
it would not necessarily increase. See generally THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 43-51 (1970); LARRY LAUDAN, PROGRESS AND ITS PROBLEMS:
TOWARDS A THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC GROWTH (1977); see also PIERRE MAURICE MARIE
DUHEM, THE AIM AND STRUCTURE OF PHYSICAL THEORY (Philip P. Wiener trans., 1954).
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evidence presented to them.262 But if a lay judge can do so on
her own, why not twelve lay jurors in their combined wisdom?
The question remains: if the problems of scientific
testimony were neither new to twentieth-century courts nor
necessarily harder to manage, then what did change during
this period? What has driven the unmistakable trend toward
ever-greater judicial scrutiny of scientific evidence? Further
research is needed before a convincing answer can be provided.
Still, any answer would have to take into account the history
outlined here. The early twentieth-century judicial attitude, I
suggest, was a direct response to the late nineteenth-century
crisis of scientific expert testimony. Unable to check either the
selection of the experts or their evidence in court, or the jury’s
assessment of this evidence, the nineteenth-century courts
were forced to admit almost everybody presented as experts,
leaving juries to assess the ensuing battles between expert
witnesses and lawyers.263 That changed in the early twentieth
century with the professionalization of American scientists
and the standardization of science education, literature, and
practices. These developments provided the American legal
system for the first time with the means to control the
performance of scientific experts in the courtroom—by
measuring the proffered individual expertise against the field’s
own standards. First offered by the Frye court, this rationale
flourished during the middle decades of the twentieth century,
thereby inculcating the exclusionary judicial attitude toward
scientific evidence, which reached its high-water mark at the
end of the century with the Daubert opinion.
The rise of mass tort litigation during the last quarter of
the twentieth century helped to extend the new judicial gatekeeping role from criminal to civil proceedings. 264 The
extraordinarily complicated nature of this new species of
lawsuit forced trial judges to become even more active players
in the litigation process, and to develop new rules and
procedures with an eye toward both economic consequences as
262
The Daubert trilogy declares so directly. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
263
See supra text accompanying notes 145-160. Whatever its failings, this
arrangement was nevertheless justified as a necessary trade-off that provided the best
“free-market” mechanism of proof testing and the best protection from the abuse of
executive power. See, e.g., Choate on Trial by Jury; New York Lawyer Addresses the
American Bar Association, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1898, at 5.
264
See SCHUCK, supra note 224, at 3-15; Bernstein, supra note 214, at 385-86,
389-90.
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well as broad social and political implications. 265 The farreaching effects of this litigation legitimated a new judicial
role, less arbitral and more managerial in kind.266 Furthermore,
the unprecedented financial risks for the defendants in mass
tort cases induced powerful economic players to put their
weight behind the long-stalling campaign for reform of legal
procedures for handling expert testimony.267 The results were
quick to show, and in the early 1990s the two-century-old
debate was red-hot again. 268 Having never addressed the
problems of science in the courts, the U.S. Supreme Court
found it necessary to do so three times during the 1990s, each
time in the context of a product liability case.269 The important
outcome of this series of Supreme Court opinions was not the
oft-discussed four-prong Daubert test, but rather the further
enhancement of the judicial gate-keeping role and its extension
to civil proceedings.270
Finally, one should note that the growing judicial
scrutiny of scientific evidence has not been driven by the loss of
judicial faith in science. 271 On the contrary, despite the
problematic history of science in the courtroom, the legal
profession has never wavered in its trust in the scientific
method.272 During the nineteenth century, this steadfast belief
265
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College of Legal Medicine; a group of eighteen scientists, scholars, and teachers of
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induced the judiciary to interpret conflicting expert testimony
not as legitimate debate, but as a sign of moral decadence.273
During the twentieth century, it pushed the judiciary even
further into scientific territory to exorcise charlatanism and
differentiate good science from bad. Consequently, at the
beginning of the twenty-first century, lay judges find themselves deeper than ever in the strange land of biostatistics,
confidence levels, meta-analysis, and falsifiability, charged
with the difficult task of weighing the merit of highly
specialized scientific claims. How well the lay judges can meet
these challenges and whether their gate-keeping role will lead
to better adjudication are questions that will bear careful
watching.
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